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INSIDER TRADING RECEIVES a substantial amount of attention from the investors, 
the government and the academicians alike. This is not surprising; given insider trading is 
widely regarded as reflecting the superior information of the insiders about the firm. 
Investors follow it closely hoping to earn abnormal profits. Government scrutinizes it 
vigorously to detect the illegal use of inside information.  Academicians use it to 
understand the extent of informational asymmetries between the insiders and the market.  
 
Of particular interest to academicians is the insider trades made by the managers. For 
example, many studies measure the information advantage of managers by calculating the 
abnormal changes in stock prices following managerial insider trades.
2 Others try to 
understand the managerial motives behind important corporate events like mergers, 
restructurings and stock issuances by examining the abnormal changes in managerial 
trading patterns prior to the announcement of such plans.
3 Insider trades provide a unique 
insight into the minds of managers whose very actions create or destroy firm value. 
 
One particular managerial decision that can affect the firm value substantially is the 
decision to engage in a merger.  Recent merger experience of the late 1990s seems to 
suggest that overvalued equity might be playing an important role in initiating mergers.  
This period witnessed an unprecedented boom in stock prices coupled with a similar 
increase in merger activity (Figure 1a). Most of the deals were financed with stock and 
the deal values represented the highest in history (Figure 1b). However, many of the giant 
stock-merger deals during this era turned out to be immensely value-destroying for the 
acquirer shareholders. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2003) show that from 1998 
through 2001, a small number of acquisition announcements by firms with extremely 
high valuations are responsible for a $240 billion loss in acquirer firm value. This 
combined with the existing empirical evidence
4 that the long run returns to acquirers 
which pay for acquisitions in stock tend to underperform those of cash acquirers led 
                                                 
2 See Jaffe (1974), Finnerty (1976), Seyhun (1986, 1988), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Lin and Howe (1990), 
Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (1999). 
3 Seyhun (1990b) finds increased purchases and no significant changes in sales prior to mergers and tender 
offers. Lee et al. (1992) find increased purchases and reduced sales prior to repurchase tender offers. 
Karpoff and Lee (1991) find increased sales prior to seasoned offerings of common stock. 
4 See Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998).   3
researchers to argue that overvaluation might have been an important determinant of the 
merger activity in that period.  
 
This paper aims to understand whether “overvaluation” is a plausible motive behind the 
recent merger activity by examining the insider trades of acquirer firm managers around 
2,105 merger announcements from 1983 to 2001. My approach is simple: if mergers are 
driven by an opportunistic desire to use overvalued equity as an acquisition currency, 
then this opportunism should also be reflected in the insider trades of the acquirer 
managers. Acquirer managers should increase their insider sales and decrease their 
insider purchases prior to mergers. However if the managers are overconfident, 
overoptimistic or plagued with hubris, there is no reason to observe any significant 
changes in their insider trading behavior prior to the mergers. My results show that 
acquirer-firm managers abnormally increase their insider sales prior to stock mergers and 
bad mergers, whereas no such change is observed prior to cash mergers and good 
mergers. The increased willingness of managers to sell stock prior to stock mergers 
provides preliminary evidence for the “overvaluation” motive behind the mergers. 
 
This paper is not meant to be a complete empirical testing of the theories of overvaluation 
driven mergers.
5 Rather it documents the opportunistic trading behavior of the managers 
and provides preliminary evidence as to whether overvaluation could be considered as an 
important determinant of merger activity. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data and method. 
Section II examines managerial insider trading around merger announcements. Section 
III concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Shleifer and Vishny (2003) develop a model of overvaluation driven mergers with rational managers and 
an irrational stock market. Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan (2004) develop a model with rational 
managers and a rational stock market where potential market value deviations from fundamental values on 
both sides of the transaction can rationally lead to a correlation between stock merger activity and market 
valuation. Both models yield similar empirical predictions.   4
I. Data 
 
A. Sample Description 
 
I searched the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions 
database for completed mergers between public companies from January 1983 to 
December 2001 where: 
 
•  The acquirer owns less than 5% of the target prior to the acquisition and buys the 
rest with the acquisition 
•  Data on method of payment, whether the deal was hostile or not and bid premium 
is available. 
•  There is price and return data for both acquirer and the target in the University of 
Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database 
•  There are no other corporate announcements like share repurchases, stock splits 
etc. concurrent with the merger announcement 
 
These requirements result in an initial sample of 2,564 mergers. Next I search for the 
insider trades of the acquirer firms’ managers in the Thomson Financial Insiders 
Database (IDF) prior to the announcement date. In order to ensure enough insider data 
coverage, I focus only on insiders which have at least two years of consecutive coverage 
in the IDF database. In addition, I require every insider to have at least one trade per year 
on average during her presence in the database. As a result, 459 observations are 
eliminated due to insufficient IDF coverage of the acquirer firm, leaving me with a final 
sample of 2,105 mergers.  
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the merger data. Acquirers are substantially 
bigger than targets and heavily use stock to finance their mergers as opposed to cash, 
49.2% versus 24.3% of the time. While acquirers earn a negative announcement 
abnormal return of -1.3%, acquisitions on average create value, the average 4-day 
announcement abnormal return for the combined firm is 1.2%.  Figures 1a and 1b show   5
the annual distribution of merger activity from 1983 through 2001. The stock-merger 
wave of the late 1990s is clearly visible; from 1995 to 2001, not only the majority of 
mergers are stock mergers, but these mergers also represent the highest-value deals 
measured as a percentage of the total market capitalization of all public firms in the 
CRSP database.
6 
 
The insider trading data comes from the IDF database, which lists the amount, type and 
date of each trade as well as the title of the insider from January 1983 to December 2000. 
To focus on information-related trades, I analyze the direct open market sale and 
purchase transactions of the managers involving at least 100 shares.
7 Using the 
managerial position descriptions in IDF database, I categorize the managers in to three 
disjoint groups ranked in the order of importance: chief executive officers (CEOs), 
directors of the board and officers.  If a person appears in more than one group, I include 
him only in the one which has the highest ranking. Since I am only interested in the 
managers’ evaluation of their firms, I exclude institutional shareholders and large 
individual shareholders who are not managers. Finally I exclude the firms in IDF 
database which could not be matched to CRSP database based on the CUSIP code. 
 
Table 3 describes the overall trading activity for 11,200 firms in the IDF database from 
January 1983 to December 2000. Panel A shows the average monthly trading activity by 
firm size. The figures are calculated as follows. First, net purchases (purchases minus 
sales) by the managers as a whole are calculated for each firm in each month. Then all 
firm-months are pooled and sorted into ten size deciles. The figures represent the average 
monthly trading activity for a typical firm in a given size decile.  Except for the smallest 
firms, managers as a whole are net-sellers in all firms. The magnitude of net-selling 
grows monotonically with firm size; with the largest firms having $1.8 million of net-
selling. Percentage of managers who are net sellers in a given month also increases with 
                                                 
6 For each year from 1983 to 2001, the percentage of total market capitalization acquired is calculated by 
dividing the total market value (measured at 3 days prior to the merger announcement)  of the target firms 
acquired in that year by the total market value at the beginning of that year of all public firms available in 
the CRSP database. 
7 Nevertheless, I also present results for the value of stocks purchased through option exercises from time 
to time for information, since most of the stock sold on the open market comes from purchases through 
option exercises.   6
firm size; only 28% of the managers are net sellers in small firms, compared to 82% in 
the largest firms. The main reason for the preponderance of sales in large firms is because 
managers in large firms usually receive part of their compensation as stock options, 
exercise the options to acquire shares, and then sell the shares. For information, I also 
report the value of stock purchased through option exercises in Table 3. As firm size gets 
larger, so does the value of options granted and hence the value of purchases through 
option exercises. For example managers in the smallest firms buy just $730 worth of 
shares through option exercises every month on average whereas managers in the largest 
firms buy $841,000 worth of shares which eventually get sold on the open market. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the average monthly trading activity for different management 
groups.
8 Without exception, all management groups are heavy net-sellers in own 
company stock on the open market. CEOs are the heaviest net-sellers in absolute and 
relative terms selling $2.6 million or 15.7% of their holdings on average.  This is not 
surprising, since they also purchase the highest amounts of company stock through option 
exercises. Net selling is most prevalent among officers; 77% of trading officers are net 
sellers in a given month on average. The question whether these trading patterns 
represent informed-trading will be addressed later in the paper.  
 
                                                 
8 The figures are calculated as follows: First net-purchases are calculated for all managers in each month. 
Then all manager-months are pooled and sorted into three management position groups and means and 
medians are calculated. The figures represent a typical manager-month in a given management position 
group.   7
II. Managerial Insider Trading and Merger Announcements 
 
A. Are Managers Informed Traders? 
  
A crucial assumption of my analysis is that the managers’ trades in their own firm’s stock 
are motivated by their beliefs about the true value of their firm.  However, the managers 
might be trading for various other reasons like liquidity concerns, rebalancing and 
diversifying their portfolios after stock price run-ups, none of which has anything to do 
with their beliefs about the true value of the firm.  For example, most of the sell trades in 
large firms occur because the managers receive a great part of their compensation in 
stock options, and they sell them in the open market for liquidity purposes. Hence it is 
crucial to first establish that managerial trades are indeed informed trades. 
In order to see whether managerial trades are informed trades, I calculate pre-trade and 
post-trade short-run cumulative abnormal returns for each managerial trading date for 
event windows up to 15 trading days around the transaction date.
9 If the managers 
purchase (sell) stock prior to announcement of favorable (unfavorable) information, then 
their purchases (sales) will be followed by positive (negative) abnormal returns. Table 4 
presents the results for 5, 10 and 15-day event windows. Purchases clearly show evidence 
of informed trading: managers as a whole gain cumulative abnormal returns ranging from 
0.8% in 5 days to 1.6% in 15 days following their purchases. Officers gain the most, with 
2.2% return in 15 days following the purchase. On the sales side, the picture is not as 
clear, we see very small but significant positive returns following sales transactions. This 
is to be expected, as sale transactions are not as clear signals of insider information as 
                                                 
9 I calculate the average cumulative abnormal returns for each managerial position as follows: First for each 
insider, I calculate the net value of all open market transactions in each trading day. If sales are higher than 
purchases, I label the net transaction on that day as a sale, if purchases are higher than sales, I label the net 
transaction on that day as a purchase. Taking the trading day as the event date (day 0) I calculate the 
cumulative abnormal return on that firm’s stock for  5, 10, and 15 trading-day windows following and 
preceding the event date. I calculate the abnormal return as the return in excess of the return on the CRSP 
value weighted index
9. I do not use CAPM or a more complicated asset pricing model to generate the 
expected returns because as Brown and Warner (1985) and Fama (1991) have noted, with the relatively 
short event windows of 5 to 15 days, the way expected returns are estimated when calculating abnormal 
returns has little effect on inferences. Finally for each managerial position I calculate the average 
cumulative abnormal return by averaging across the cumulative abnormal returns following all sales and 
purchases of the managers in that managerial position. I adjust the standard errors for serial correlation 
using clustering at calendar time.     8
purchases. This is due to the fact that most of the sale transactions are motivated due to 
non-informational reasons like the exercising of stock options for reasons like portfolio 
rebalancing, diversification or meeting liquidity needs. There is however a second, less 
obvious sign of managerial market-timing. If the purchases (sales) are preceded by 
abnormally low (high) returns which are reversed during the post event period, one can 
argue that managers use insider information to purchase when the prices are lowest and 
sell when the prices are highest. The “Reversal” column of Table 4 shows the difference 
between the post-event and pre-event cumulative abnormal returns. Without exception, 
the post-sales CARs are significantly lower than pre-sales CARs suggesting that 
managers might be timing their insider sales to coincide with peak stock valuations. To 
better see this point, Figure 2a shows the average cumulative abnormal returns from 90 
days before to 90 days after the sales. All management groups successfully time their 
sales to coincide with near-peak stock valuations, with CEOs doing an especially good 
job. The pre-trade run-up in stock price stops right after the sales and turns in to a decline 
in the middle-run (and hence not captured by the short event windows used). Similarly, 
Figure 2b shows that managers seem to purchase following big declines in stock prices 
which are reversed almost immediately in the post-purchase period. Evidence from both 
sales and purchases seem to support the existence of informed managerial trading.  
An alternative way to see whether managers are engaging in informed trades is to look at 
the biggest trades both in absolute and relative sense. Unlike the small trades, big trades 
are less likely to simply be motivated by liquidity, portfolio rebalancing or diversification 
motives. Therefore they should have higher informational content. Table 5 presents the 
cumulative abnormal returns for pre-event and post-event windows for purchases and 
sales for a 5-day window
10. Absolute trade size is measured by the number of shares 
traded whereas relative trade size is measured by the percentage of common share 
holdings traded. In line with our expectations, the results show that bigger purchases are 
followed by larger positive CARs and bigger return reversals. Similarly, bigger sales are 
also followed by bigger return reversals. Figures 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b show the CARs from 
90 days before to 90 days after the trade for different trade size categories. Without 
                                                 
10 Results for 10-day and 15-day windows are qualitatively similar and hence not reported for brevity.   9
exception, bigger purchases are preceded with lower returns which are quickly reversed 
in the post-trade period, and bigger sales are preceded with higher returns which are 
gradually reversed in the post-trade period. 
  
The evidence presented so far seem to suggest that managerial trades are on average 
informed trades and motivated by managers’ inside information about the true value of 
the firm. Although most of the sell trades are done to liquidate the stock options received 
as part of compensation, the fact that they coincide with peak stock-price valuations is a 
clear indication that the timing of those trades is not random, and reflects managerial 
information about the value of the firm.   10
B. Managerial Opportunism or Optimism? 
 
In order to understand whether the managers are behaving opportunistically or 
optimistically in their personal trades, one needs to measure the abnormal changes in the 
managerial trading activity around important corporate announcements and other firm-
specific surprise events.  In this section I first examine the abnormal trading activity prior 
to firm-specific “good” and “bad” events in a generalized framework. Then I specifically 
focus on managerial trading prior to merger announcements.  
 
B.1 Measuring Abnormal Insider Trading 
 
There are alternative methods to measure abnormal trading activity: For example Jenter 
(2004) uses pooled time-series cross-section regressions to control for non-informational 
motivations for trading. Seyhun (1990b), in an event-study framework of merger 
announcements, uses a matching-sample approach and defines the abnormal trading 
activity both relative to the managerial trades of the same firm outside the takeover 
period (time-series control sample) and relative to the managerial trades of size-matched 
non-acquirer firms inside the takeover period (cross-sectional control sample). I employ 
both these approaches with some modifications in order to ensure that my results are not 
the artifact of a specific method used.  
 
B.2 Non-Informational Motives for Insider Trading 
 
Central to any method of measuring abnormal trading is the need to control for non-
informational motives for trading. There can be mechanical reasons as to why some 
managers sell more: for example, managers who receive larger stock or option grants in a 
given period will sell more on the open market (Ofeck and Yermack (2000)). To control 
for this portfolio rebalancing and diversification motive, I include the dollar value of 
stock and option holdings and stock grants (where available) in the regressions. The value 
of option holdings and stock grants are not available in the insiders database, but the 
value of stock purchased through option exercises, gifts and other non-open market   11
means are. Therefore I use the dollar values of stock purchased through option exercises, 
gifts and other non-open market means during the previous twelve months as proxies for 
option holdings and stock grants
11.  
 
Following large increases in stock price, managers will find an increased portion of their 
personal wealth tied in company stock. Therefore they will be more likely to sell stock in 
order to diversify away from company stock. To control for this diversification motive, I 
include prior stock return in the regressions. 
 
Managers holding company stock are exposed to both idiosyncratic and total firm risk. 
Melbourek (2000) shows that managers in more risky companies tend to sell stock more 
aggressively. In order to control for firm risk and the change in risk on trading behavior, I 
include past stock return volatility and change in volatility in the regressions. 
 
It is a well documented empirical fact that managers in bigger firms sell more stock than 
those in smaller firms. My results in Table 3 also confirm this. Therefore log of total 
assets is included in the regressions to control for size effects. 
 
Recent research shows that managerial trading activity is not randomly distributed among 
value and growth stocks. Rozeff and Zaman (1998) show that managers in growth firms 
tend to sell more equity than managers in value firms, i.e. they have “contrarian” views 
about their firms. They interpret this as evidence that the market overvalues growth 
stocks and undervalues value stocks.  Jenter (2004) finds evidence for the contrarian 
nature of managerial trading even after controlling for non-information motives for 
trading by keeping managerial ownership levels and compensation grants constant. I 
include dummies for book-to-market deciles in the regressions to abstract from any book-
to-market related effects. 
                                                 
11 When examining the trades of top managers, I get the value of option holdings and stock grants directly 
from the Execucomp database, but this effectively limits my sample to the 1991-2000 period since 
Execucomp coverage starts in 1991. 
   12
 
Finally there might be industry and time specific reasons affecting insider trading. To 
control for these factors, industry and time dummies are included in the regressions. 
 
B.3 Good versus Bad Returns 
 
If managers are indeed opportunistic, they should abnormally increase their net-sales 
prior to a firm-specific “bad” event and abnormally increase their net-purchases prior to a 
“good” event.  To see whether this is the case, I search for firm-specific bad events and 
good events as follows: I first identify firms with a single-day market-adjusted return of 
less (more) than -30% (+30%). In order to ensure this dramatic return is unprecedented, I 
eliminate the firms if they had a one day return less (more) than -20% (+20%) during the 
preceding one-year period. This procedure yields 1,689 single-day “disaster” returns with 
a mean of -39.1% and 2,258 single-day “good” returns with a mean of 42.3%. Next, I 
measure the abnormal trading activity prior to these good and bad events using the 
regression approach of Jenter (2004). Specifically, I first calculate for every manager in 
each of the 11,200 firms in the IDF database the sum of his/her net purchases in a given 
calendar quarter. Net purchase is defined as the dollar value of purchases minus sales of 
company stock on the open market. I also calculate net purchases as a percentage of prior 
exposure where prior exposure is defined as the value of common share holdings at the 
beginning of the quarter. I then regress these measures on firm-specific and manager-
specific control variables, and dummy variables showing whether a given firm will 
experience a good return or a bad return one, two, three and four quarters from now. The 
coefficients of these dummy variables will show the abnormal level of trading. For 
example a significant negative coefficient for the “BAD Return in Quarter t+3” variable 
means that net-purchases are abnormally reduced (net-sales are increased) in response to 
a bad return event that will occur in the third quarter following the current quarter. This is 
equivalent to saying that net sales are increased abnormally in the third quarter preceding 
the merger quarter. Table 6 presents the results. Each column is a regression. Dependent 
variables are dollar value of individual net purchases and individual net purchases as a 
percentage of prior exposure in columns one and three, and firm level averages of these   13
variables in columns two and four. Control variables are book-to-market decile dummies, 
prior stock return in the last two quarters , RETq(t-2),q(t) , and the two quarters before that, 
RETq(t-4),q(t-2) , prior stock volatility in the two quarters before the last two quarters, 
VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) , and the change in volatility VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) , dollar value of 
equity stake which is the number of common shares held at the beginning of the quarter 
times the beginning of the quarter stock price. Insiders database does not report the level 
of option holdings and it is not feasible to hand-collect this data for 1,518,164 manager-
quarters. However it reports when an option is exercised to purchase stock. Therefore I 
use the dollar value of shares purchased through option exercises during the last twelve 
months as a proxy for option holdings. I also include the dollar value of "Other" share 
purchases and “Gift” share purchases during the last twelve months in order to take into 
account the value of purchases through stock grants and option grants that are incorrectly 
assigned into the other category. I also include 20 industry dummies as defined by 
Grinblatt and Moskovitz and (1999) and year-quarter dummies to control for industry and 
time specific effects. 
 
The results in Table 6 show clear evidence of market timing by the managers. The 
coefficients for bad return dummies are negative and highly significant indicating that 
managers increase their sales abnormally prior to the bad return quarter. On average they 
increase their sales between $33,000 and $49,000 per quarter during the four quarters 
before the bad return quarter. Managers seem to anticipate the good returns as well, 
although not as strongly, they increase their net purchases by $5,000 if there will be a 
good return in the next two quarters. Other variables have the expected signs, similar to 
Jenter (2004) I find that managers are contrarian investors, that is, managers in low book-
to-market (growth) firms sell more than those in high-book-to-market (value) firms. Prior 
return and prior volatility have negative signs meaning high past returns and volatilities 
cause a decrease in net-purchases because managers will sell more for portfolio 
rebalancing and diversification reasons. Dollar value of shares purchased in the last 
twelve months through option exercises, gifts and other methods is negatively related 
with the net purchases, since the more stock managers purchase through non-open market 
channels, the more stock they will sell afterwards in the open market. In column three,   14
the regression is estimated using individual net purchases as percentage of prior 
exposure. Here we see that managers sell between 1.9% and 3.6% of their common share 
holdings per quarter during the four quarters prior to a bad return event. The results for 
bad mergers are robust to averaging among all the managers in a given firm as shown in 
columns two and four. In all four regressions, managers sell significantly more prior to 
bad return quarters than prior to good return quarters, as confirmed by F-tests for the 
equality of the coefficients of bad and good return quarter dummies. These results show 
that managers are able to anticipate extremely bad returns and act opportunistically to 
gain from this by increasing their insider sales. 
 
In order to see whether this opportunism is also seen among the top managers, Table 7 
repeats the same analysis for the managers that are present both in the insiders database 
and the Execucomp database. Execucomp database includes compensation and option 
holdings data for top five officers in S&P 500 companies. By combining the two datasets, 
I am able to directly control for the level of option holdings, stock grants and the value of 
total compensation. The new control variables are the intrinsic value of exercisible 
options, the intrinsic value of unexercisible options, dollar value of stock grants, dollar 
value of total compensation and the Black-Scholes value of option grants. Since 
Execucomp is an annual database, for each quarter, these variables are measured as of 
end of the previous calendar year. The additional benefit of using Execucomp data comes 
at a cost, my sample size is reduced considerably from 1,518,164 manager quarters to 
13,028 and the time coverage is limited to 1991 to 2000 instead of 1983 to 2001 since 
Execucomp data starts only in 1991. 
 
The evidence of managerial opportunism in Table 7 is somewhat weaker, but we still see 
significantly increased dollar and percentage net-sales prior to bad returns (columns two 
and  three) and significantly increased net-purchases prior to good returns (columns one 
and four). Comparing the coefficients for bad and good return quarter dummies, we see 
that managers sell considerably more in the current quarter if there will be a bad return 
three quarters from now as opposed to a good return. Overall, Table 7 shows that 
managerial opportunism in insider trades, albeit weaker, is observed among top managers   15
as well, no matter how closely their trades might be scrutinized by the regulatory 
agencies and investors alike. 
 
Next I examine whether managers behave opportunistically or optimistically in their 
personal trades prior to merger announcements. 
 
C. Managerial Opportunism around Mergers 
 
C.1 Good Mergers versus Bad Mergers 
 
A good way of detecting whether managers behave opportunistically or optimistically in 
their trades prior to the merger is to examine the managerial trades prior to “good” and 
“bad” mergers. Opportunistic managers will alter their trading patterns prior to the 
merger if they are able to anticipate the market’s reaction to the merger announcement. 
Namely, they will increase their sales and decrease their purchases before the 
announcement of bad mergers and decrease their sales and increase their purchases 
before the good mergers. On the other hand, if they are optimistic, they will increase their 
purchases and not increase their sales before the bad mergers. 
 
A merger is classified as a “good” merger from acquirer managers’ point of view if the 
acquirer’s four-day announcement cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is higher than 10% 
and as “bad” mergers if the acquirer’s announcement CAR is less than -10%. Similarly 
for a target manager a merger is “good” if target’s four-day announcement cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) is higher than 10% and “bad” it is less than -10%. This definition 
yields 154 bad mergers and 80 good mergers from acquirer managers’ point of view and 
57 bad mergers and 1,261 good mergers from target managers’ point of view. I create 
dummy variables  which are equal to 1 if a particular firm will become an acquirer 
(target) in a good or bad merger from acquirer (target) manager’s point of view in one, 
two, three and four quarters from the current quarter. 
   16
 The announcement CARs are calculated using a four day window starting at day -2 and 
ending at day +1 relative to the announcement date. Abnormal (or “excess”) returns are 
calculated by subtracting the return on the value weighted market index during the event 
window from the firm returns. Once the acquisitions are classified this way, I repeat the 
analysis in Table 7. Table 8 presents the results. 
 
The results reveal that acquirer and target managers abnormally increase their net-sales 
prior to bad mergers. A typical acquirer manager increases his quarterly net-sales 
between $55,000 and $76,000 (column one) or by 3.5% to 3.9% (column three) in 
response to a future anticipated bad merger. A typical target manager increases his 
quarterly net-sales between $69,000 and $156,000 or by 4.5% to 6.4% of his/her 
holdings. However neither acquirer nor target managers exhibit any abnormal increases 
in net-purchases prior to good mergers. In fact in some cases we see increases in net-
sales. To better understand whether managers are trading differently prior to bad and 
good mergers, I test whether the coefficients of bad merger dummies are equal to the 
corresponding good merger dummies using an F-test (p-values are reported at the bottom 
of the table). These tests reveal that acquirer managers in bad mergers sell significantly 
more in both dollar an percentage terms than acquirer managers in good mergers in the 
second quarter preceding the merger quarter. The dollar net-purchases of target managers 
also exhibit a similar pattern. It seems that both acquirer and target managers can 
correctly anticipate the value consequences of a future merger as early as two quarters 
before the merger quarter. 
  
 
C.2. Discussion 
 
My results point to the existence of opportunistic trading among the managers prior to the 
mergers. This stands in sharp contrast to Seyhun (1990b) who finds no evidence of 
managerial opportunism prior to 23 “good” mergers and 42 “bad” mergers as defined by 
2-day acquirer announcement abnormal returns. Seyhun (1990b) uses a different sample 
period (1975-1986 vs. 1983-2001) and sample size (393 vs. 2,105 total acquisitions; 23   17
vs. 154 good acquisitions, 42 vs. 80 bad acquisitions) studied. In order to explore this 
difference, I take the intersection of my sample with Seyhun (1990b)’s sample and 
restrict it to 1983-1986 period and repeat the analysis in Table 8. Results are reported in 
the first two columns of Table 9.  Consistent with Seyhun (1990b) I find no evidence of 
opportunistic behavior prior to bad mergers. Hence the difference in the results seems to 
come from the very different sample periods covered in each study. 
  
These results are not consistent with theories of managerial overoptimism, 
overconfidence or hubris as a primary motivation to engage in acquisitions. Roll’s (1986) 
hubris hypothesis predicts that managers will overestimate their abilities to generate 
returns, both in their current firms and potential takeover targets. Malmendier and Tate 
(2003) argue that overconfident CEOs are more likely to conduct mergers when they 
have sufficient internal resources, and they conduct more “bad” mergers on average. 
However, if managerial optimism or overconfidence were indeed a primary motive in 
mergers, then this optimism and overconfidence should also be reflected in managerial 
trades prior to the merger. In other words, there is no reason for managers to trade 
differently prior to “good” and “bad” mergers; in both cases one should observe increases 
in purchases and no increase in sales. This is clearly not the case for the sample studied. 
Not only managers in bad mergers increase their sales above normal levels prior to the 
announcement, they also sell more than managers in good mergers.  
 
One important difference between my approach and Malmendier and Tate’s (2003) is that 
my measure of “bad” mergers is different. Malmendier and Tate (2003) use diversifying 
acquisitions to proxy for “bad” mergers. However recent research provides no 
justification for singling out diversifying acquisitions as value destroying. For example, 
Akbulut and Matsusaka (2003) show that during Malmendier and Tate’s sample period 
from 1980 to 1994 there are no significant differences in acquirer returns in diversifying 
and related acquisitions.  Moreover, the market does not view diversifying acquisitions as 
value destroying on average; the combined announcement returns are 0.30% 
(insignificant) for 1980-83, 1.67% (significant at 1% level) for 1984-89 and 0.44% 
(insignificant) for 1990-93 periods.  My method of looking at market’s reaction to the   18
merger is a more objective way of classifying mergers as “bad”, or “value-destroying”. 
Moreover, Malmendier and Tate (2003) completely rule out the insider information 
motive for prolonged holding of stock options. In their story, a CEO holding his stock 
options too long is doing so because he is “overconfident”, and their analysis is based on 
this overconfidence measure. An alternative explanation for prolonged holdings might be 
that the CEO has private information that the stock prices will rise in the future due to an 
upcoming merger, so he will wait until the merger announcement to exercise his options. 
If this is the case, one will find a higher propensity to acquire among the managers who 
hold options until expiration. Malmendier and Tate (2003) dismiss this possibility by 
saying that “..This (insider information) explanation, however suggest that we would 
observe insider trades right around the merger. This does not seem to be the case 
empirically (Boehmer and Netter, 1997)”. Indeed, Boehmer and Netter (1997), following 
a similar method with us, find no significant changes in managerial trading patterns for 
371 acquisitions between 1975 and 1987. Their sample consists of 184 good and 187 bad 
acquisitions as defined based on the 6-day announcement abnormal return being positive 
or negative. However like Seyhun’s (1990b) sample, their sample also does not include 
the stock-merger boom of the late 1990s where, ex-post many mergers are believed to be 
undertaken by opportunistic managers trying to take advantage of high stock market 
valuations. To explore the differences in our results I take the intersection of my sample 
with theirs, leaving me with a sample from 1983 to 1987. I then repeat the analysis in 
Table 8. The results are presented in Table 9. columns three and four. Confirming their 
results, I find that the evidence for managerial opportunism is much weaker in this 
period, with mostly insignificant increases in net-sales prior to bad mergers. This 
suggests that the difference between my results and Boehmer and Netter (1997)’s results 
are indeed due to the different time periods studied. 
 
In order to see whether managers are deliberately postponing their option exercises to 
benefit from the high stock prices after the good mergers, I look at stock purchases 
through option exercises around good and bad mergers. Table 10 presents the results. The 
dependent variables are the dollar value of individual net-purchases in column one and 
the dollar value of individual stock purchases through stock options in column two. I   19
create dummy variables which are equal to one if a given firm was an acquirer or a target 
in a good or a bad merger in the previous and future four quarters starting from the 
current quarter.  I also include but not report in Table 10 dummies for whether a given 
firm was an acquirer or a target in a “normal” merger, meaning the merger was neither a 
good nor a bad one. Hence the coefficients of bad and good acquirer dummies are 
directly interpretable as the abnormal trading in response to an upcoming or past bad or 
good merger.  For example the coefficient of “Bad Acquirer in Quarter t-1” will show the 
abnormal purchases through stock options one quarter after the bad merger quarter. 
 
Results show that there is no abnormal change in acquirer managers’ purchases through 
option exercises prior to good mergers. However there is a dramatic increase right after 
the good mergers: the coefficient of “Good Acquirer in Quarter t-1” dummy is $630,000 
and significant which means a typical manager in a good acquirer increases his/her 
purchases through stock option exercises by $630,000 right after the merger. This finding 
seems to suggest that acquirer managers hold off exercising their options until after the 
favorable merger is announced. We observe the opposite situation in bad mergers: 
managers increase their option exercises by $262,000 just before the bad merger and 
decrease their option exercises by $212,000 right after the bad merger.  These results, 
contrary to Malmendier and Tate (2003)’s assumption, seem to suggest that managers are 
actively timing their option exercises to fall before bad mergers and after good mergers.  
 
In the light of this evidence for managerial opportunism, it seems overconfidence, 
overoptimism or hubris are not the primary motives behind the sample of mergers 
studied. 
 
C.3 Stock Mergers versus Cash Mergers 
 
An alternative way to see whether the managers trade opportunistically prior to mergers 
is to compare the trading behavior before stock and cash mergers. The asymmetric 
information story tells us that the method of payment chosen may signal new information 
about the true value of the firm to the market. For example when stock is used as a   20
method of payment, the market’s reaction will compound both a reaction to the merger 
itself and the increase in the outstanding equity. If managers have more information about 
the true value of the firm than the market, they will want to issue new equity when they 
think that their stock is overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). As a result, the market will 
react negatively to the issuance of new stock. An extensive empirical literature shows that 
seasoned equity issues are associated with negative announcement returns of about -3 
percent on average (Smith,1986), and the returns from merger announcements are about 3 
percent lower when stock is used instead of cash (Andrade et al.,2001). These findings 
seem to suggest that overvalued firms prefer stock as a method of payment whereas 
undervalued firms prefer cash. Therefore, opportunistic managers will increase their sales 
and decrease their purchases prior to stock mergers and decrease their sales and increase 
their purchases prior to cash mergers.  
 
Table 11 examines the abnormal managerial trading by acquirer and target managers 
prior to 2,105 merger announcements involving 1,189 acquirers. The method of payment 
is only stock in 1,035 mergers, only cash in 512 mergers and a mixture of stock, cash and 
other securities in the remaining 558 mergers. The dependent variables are same as 
before, namely the dollar value of individual net purchases in column one, individual net 
purchases as a percentage of prior exposure in column three and the averages of these 
variables across all managers in a given firm in columns two and four. In order to 
measure the abnormal trading in the current quarter in response to an acquisition in the 
next four quarters, I create dummy variables for both acquirers and targets which are 
equal to 1 if acquirer or target is involved in a stock, cash or a mixed acquisition in one of 
the next four quarters. Since I focus exclusively on stock and cash acquisitions, I do not 
report the coefficients for mixed acquisition dummies in Table 11 for brevity. A 
significant negative sign for any of these dummies will indicate increased abnormal 
selling prior to the merger announcement whereas a significant positive sign will indicate 
increased abnormal buying prior to the merger announcement. The control variables are 
the same as before. 
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Results in table 11 show that both acquirer and target managers significantly increase 
their net-sales prior to stock acquisitions both in dollar and percentage terms. Acquirer 
managers abnormally sell from $10,500 to $23,900 or 0.82% to 1.25% of their holdings 
each quarter during the four quarters prior to a stock merger announcement. Target 
managers sell between $8,500 to $22,300 or 0.65% to 2.98% of their holdings each 
quarter. These results are robust to averaging across all the managers in a given firm 
(columns two and three). Prior to cash acquisitions however, neither acquirer nor target 
managers exhibit such significant changes in trading activity. The coefficients for the 
dummy variables are mostly positive and insignificant. Finally an F-test for the equality 
of coefficients shows that both acquirer and target managers sell significantly more prior 
to stock acquisitions than prior to cash acquisitions in all four quarters prior to the merger 
quarter. 
 
Next I look at the trades of top-managers covered by Execucomp. Table 12 presents the 
results. While we still observe signs of increased selling prior to stock acquisitions, 
evidence is generally weaker. We see in column one that acquirer managers increase their 
sales by $167,000 and $280,000 two and three quarters before a stock merger
12. Target 
managers do not significantly change their sales, but significantly increase their 
purchases by $100,000 one quarter before a cash merger. There are no signs of significant 
changes in trading as a percentage of prior exposure.   
 
Taken together, the results in Tables 11 and 12 show that even after controlling for non-
informational motivations for insider trading, both acquirer and target managers 
significantly increase their insider sales prior to stock acquisitions, and sell more prior to 
stock acquisitions than prior to cash acquisitions. Similar findings are reported by studies 
examining managerial trading around seasoned equity issues. Karpoff and Lee (1991), 
Lee (1997) and Kahle (2000) all find that insider sales increase relative to insider 
purchases before seasoned equity offerings. Jenter (2004) finds increased managerial 
                                                 
12 These are significantly higher than their sales two and three quarters before a cash merger as confirmed 
by an F-test for the equality of coefficients (not reported for brevity).   22
selling in years when there is a seasoned equity offering, after controlling for managerial 
ownership levels.   
 
C.4 Robustness 
 
In order to make sure that these results are not an artifact of the regression method I am 
using, I repeat the analysis for stock and cash mergers using the matching sample method 
used by Seyhun (1990b) with some modifications. Seyhun (1990b) defines the abnormal 
trading activity both relative to the managerial trades of the same firm outside the 
takeover period (time-series control sample) and relative to the managerial trades of size-
matched non-acquirer firms inside the takeover period (cross-sectional control sample). 
The takeover period is defined as the 19 months from 12 months prior to 6 months after 
the merger announcement month. Due to the data limitations with the time-series control 
sample method, I only use the cross-sectional control sample method here. I define my 
takeover period as the twelve month period prior to merger announcement. Some 
acquirers make multiple acquisitions in a very short time period which might cause the 
takeover periods to overlap in calendar time. To prevent such cases, if there is such an 
overlap, I only use the largest merger by the acquirer in terms of the relative size of the 
target compared to the acquirer. In order to ensure enough data coverage in the insiders 
database during the takeover period, I require the first entry in the insiders database for a 
given firm to be before the beginning of the takeover period, and require the last entry to 
be after the merger announcement date. I also drop the mergers where the acquirers or 
targets cannot be matched to a control firm. These additional data constraints greatly 
reduce my sample size: I am able to construct a control sample for the acquirer (target) 
managers in 1,188 (1,104) out of 2,105 mergers.  
 
 In order to better control for non-informationally motivated trades, I make important 
changes to Seyhun (1990b)’s methodology. Instead of only matching on size, I match 
each manager in acquirer and target firms to a control manager in a size-prior stock 
return-industry matched non-merger firm based on the value of managerial common 
share holdings Specifically, I require the dollar value of common share holdings of the   23
control manager to be between 70% and 130% of that of acquirer or target firm 
managers. I match based on size by sorting all the firms into five size groups and 
requiring the acquirer or target firm to be in the same size group with the control firm. I 
require the control firm to have a past 12 month stock return within -10% and +10% of 
that of the acquirer and target firms. Finally I use the 20 industry definitions used by 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999) to match based on industry. Matching is done at thirteen 
months prior to the merger announcement based on the values of the matching variables 
at that moment in time. 
 
Once matching is completed, I construct the expected levels of insider trading using this 
cross-sectional control sample. I then compare the actual and the expected levels of 
trading and compute the significance of the difference. The null hypothesis is that merger 
activity does not affect normal insider trading patterns during the takeover period. In my 
empirical tests, I follow Seyhun (1990b) and use the bootstrap randomization method. As 
Seyhun (1990b) shows, the parametric tests such as the two-sample means test or the 
nonparametric tests such as the median test or the sum of the ranks tests have low power 
since insider trading activity is non-normal, infrequent and highly skewed in magnitude.  
The bootstrap randomization method works as follows. First I randomly match each 
acquirer and target firm manager with corresponding control managers in size-prior stock 
return-industry matched non-merger firms based on the value of common share holdings 
at thirteen month prior to the merger announcement. I then record the managerial trading 
activity for the control managers and compute the overall sample statistics. I repeat this 
process 1,000 times and obtain the empirical distribution of the sample statistics under 
the null hypothesis. The expected value for a sample statistic is the median of the 
empirical distribution of that statistic under the null hypothesis. In order to test for the 
significance of the difference between the realized value and the expected value of a 
statistic, I compare the realized value with the empirical distribution under the null. The 
results are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 shows the absolute and relative net-purchases of acquirer and target firm 
managers in the twelve month period prior to the merger month. Columns one and three   24
report the dollar value of individual net purchases and individual net purchases as a 
percentage of share holdings at the beginning of the period. Columns two and three report 
the same variables averaged across all managers in a given firm. The first entries denote 
the average net purchases followed by the expected value of net purchases in row two 
and sample size in row three. ***, ** and * denote whether the average net purchases are 
significantly different from the expected value of net purchases at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels.  Results show a dramatic increase in sales for both acquirer and target managers 
prior to stock acquisitions in both dollar and percentage terms. Moreover, these trades 
represent significant portfolio adjustments: Column three shows that acquirer managers 
sell 52.9% of their holdings in the one year period prior to stock mergers compared to an 
expected value of 15.4% and the difference is significant at 1% level. Similarly target 
managers sell 35% of their shares compared to an expected value of 15% and the 
difference is significant at 1% level.  We also observe some increase in sales prior to cash 
mergers as well, however for all four measures, managers in stock mergers sell 
significantly more than managers in cash mergers in the one year period prior to the 
merger. These results are qualitatively in line with those obtained using the regressions, 
suggesting that the results are robust to using different methods to measure abnormal 
insider trading activity. 
 
D. Discussion 
 
The evidence reported for stock and cash mergers lends itself to multiple interpretations. 
One possible interpretation is a pure asymmetric information story. Assume that the only 
inside information the managers possess is that they will conduct a merger soon and that 
the managers do not possess any insider information about the value of the firm.  In this 
case, managerial trades will only be affected by the anticipation of the merger and not 
due to any perceived misvaluation. If the managers can correctly anticipate the mergers 
as value-destroying or value-creating, then prior to bad mergers there will be increased 
sales and reduced purchases whereas prior to good mergers there will be increased 
purchases and reduced sales. Similarly if the managers can anticipate the method of 
payment that will be used, they will sell more and purchase less prior to stock mergers.   25
This is because of the well-known fact that announcement returns in stock mergers are on 
average 3% lower than those in cash mergers.  
 
There are a number of concerns with this interpretation. First, managers do not seem to 
anticipate the merger itself or its value consequences long before the merger, but they 
somehow act as if they correctly anticipate the method of payment as early as three to 
four quarters prior to the merger.  There are no significant differences in sales prior to 
bad mergers and good mergers as early as three to four months prior to the merger: the 
coefficients for the bad merger dummies are not significantly different from the 
coefficients of the good merger dummies for this period. (see the F-tests for the equality 
of coefficients at the bottom of Table 8),. On the other hand, managers in stock mergers 
sell significantly more than managers in cash acquisitions as early three and four quarters  
prior to the merger (see the F-tests for the equality of coefficients at the bottom of Table 
11).  It would be a bit forced to interpret these findings as managers correctly anticipating 
the method of payment that will be used as early as three to four quarters prior to merger 
when they cannot correctly anticipate the valuation consequences that early. Instead it 
might be more plausible to think that managers in stock and cash mergers are simply 
reacting to information they have at that time, and that information is different for future 
cash-acquirers and future stock-acquirers.  One such information is the managers’ 
perceptions about the value of their firms. The observed managerial trading behavior 
prior to stock and cash mergers is consistent with the interpretation that managers in 
future stock-acquirers are more likely to believe that their firm is overvalued and 
therefore increase their selling more than the managers in future cash-acquirers.  If the 
managers believe that their firm is overvalued, they will be more likely to acquire for 
stock than for cash since they expect negative future returns on their stock. On the other 
hand, if they believe that their firm is undervalued, they will be more likely to acquire for 
cash than stock since the expected future returns on stock is higher than the expected 
future returns on cash. This is not to say that managers do not anticipate the value 
consequences at all, my results from bad mergers show that they do, at least starting from 
two quarters before the merger. However given the prevalence of the different trading 
patterns for cash and stock mergers starting as early as four quarters before the merger, I   26
believe that trading based on the value consequences of the merger is a secondary motive 
in managerial trading prior to the merger. 
 
A second concern with the merger anticipation idea is that, if the managerial trades are 
only reflecting the managers’ anticipation of the merger then there is no reason for the 
pre-merger stock returns to be different in firms whose managers are net sellers and firms 
whose managers are net buyers. However, Akbulut (2005b) shows that acquirers with 
high net-seller managers have 33.1% higher pre-merger one-year returns than acquirers 
with high net-buyer managers. Once again the observed pattern is more consistent with a 
misvaluation story where managers in firms with high stock returns in the past are selling 
their overvalued shares prior to the merger whereas managers in firms with low past 
returns believe their firm is undervalued and are increasing their purchases. 
 
Taken together, the evidence from good versus bad and stock versus cash mergers 
suggest that the managers trade opportunistically in their personal portfolios around 
merger announcements.  Moreover, the increased insider selling prior to stock mergers 
suggests that overvaluation should be considered as an important managerial motive 
behind the mergers. 
 
E. Case studies 
 
The evidence so far seems to support that overvaluation might be an important factor 
driving the merger activity. An obvious question comes to mind: If overvaluation is 
indeed such an important factor in initiating the mergers, shouldn’t it be acknowledged 
by at least some of the market participants following the merger announcement?  As a 
final step, I examine whether market participants viewed a given merger as motivated by 
the overvaluation of the acquirer firm. To do this, I select the top 100 mergers in terms of 
the size of the target. I then read the merger announcement articles in Wall Street Journal 
(WSJ) at or after the announcement date. I identify the cases when the article explicitly 
mentions that the acquisition is driven mainly by the high stock valuations of the 
acquirer. For 22 of the 100 acquisitions article explicitly mentions the high stock   27
valuations of the acquirer as the main factor. For the remaining 78 of them I do not find 
any mention of overvaluation in the article. Table 14 shows the mergers that are viewed 
as overvalued in the WSJ articles along with an excerpt from the article. In most of the 
articles, it is clearly stated that acquirer firm is opportunistically using its high stock 
valuations to buy the target firm.  The next natural step is to examine whether managers 
indeed take advantage of overvalued equity by increasing their insider sales prior to the 
merger. For this purpose, I calculate the abnormal managerial trading activity using the 
matching sample approach. I am able to find data for 12 of the 22 overvalued firms and 
54 of the 78 “not-overvalued” firms in the insiders database. Overall there are 147 
managers in the overvalued sample and 655 managers in the not-overvalued sample. 
Table 15 presents the results. 
 
A typical manager in an overvalued acquirer sells a staggering $3.6 million worth of 
company stock in the year before the merger whereas the expected level is just 1.3 
million. In relative terms, this corresponds to 144.8% of his prior common share 
holdings, which is almost four times higher than the expected value of 38.5 %. On the 
other hand we actually see a decrease in dollar net-sales for a typical manager in the “not-
overvalued” group. The difference between two groups is $2.78 million and highly 
significant. These results confirm our basic intuition that the managers in overvalued 
firms opportunistically take advantage of overvaluation by increasing their insider sales. 
Examining managerial insider trading seems to be a good way to identify the existence of 
overvaluation. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
This paper examined whether overvalued equity is a plausible managerial motive for 
conducting mergers by examining the managerial insider trades around merger 
announcements. Results show that managers behave opportunistically in their personal 
trades around merger announcements: they abnormally increase their sales prior to stock 
mergers and bad mergers whereas no such change is observed prior to cash mergers and 
good mergers.  Moreover these results are robust to controlling for many non-  28
informational motives for insider trading like portfolio rebalancing, diversification, 
reducing exposure to firm risk among others.  
The willingness of managers to sell company prior to stock acquisitions is consistent with 
the idea that managers acquire other firms for stock when they think their stock is 
overvalued. This suggests that overvaluation might have played an important role in 
initiating many of the mergers we saw in the recent merger wave. A direct implication of 
this study is that it provides a natural way of measuring overvaluation. Those firms where 
managers are net sellers in company stock can be considered as overvalued and those 
firms where managers are net buyers can be considered as undervalued. This in turn will 
provide an alternative way of testing the predictions of the theories of overvaluation 
driven mergers.    29
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 Observations
All public mergers in SDC between 1983-2001 where: 2,564
    -Both acquirer and target have CRSP data
    -The acquirer owns less than 5% of the target before the merger
    -There are no other announcements during the 4-day event window
Acquirer is not in the insiders database -459
Final sample 2,105
This table describes the data sources and catalogs the reasons why observations were deleted. Data
sources are abbreviated as follows: CRSP is the stock database at the Center for Research in Security
Prices at the University of Chicago, SDC is the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions Database.
Table 1
Sample ConstructionMean Median
Acquirer Market Value (million $) 12.7 1.8
Target Market Value (million $) 0.8 0.1
Relative Size (%) 25.0 10.6
Annoucement Abnormal Returns [-2,+1] (%)
          Acquirer -1.3 -0.9
          Target 18.9 16.9
          Combined 1.2 0.8
Method of Payment (%)
          Stock Only 49.2
          Mixed 26.5
          Cash Only 24.3
Diversifying Acquisition (%) 12.3
Tender Offers (%) 18.7
Hostile Bids (%) 1.9
Multiple Bidders (%) 3.8
N 2,105
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics - Merger Data
Sample includes completed merger bids and tender offers where both acquirer and target
were listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during 1983-2001. Acquirer and target
market values are measured at day -3 relative to the acquisition announcement date (day
0). Relative size is the ratio of target market value to acquirer market value. Acquirer and
target cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are measured over the four days (-2, 1) around
the announcement (day 0) of the acquisition. Combined CAR is calculated as the value
weighted average of acquirer and target CARs weighted using day -3 market values of the
acquirer and the target. Diversification is defined as acquirer and target not having a
common 2-digit SIC code in their first 6 SIC codes.Figure 1b
Percentage of CRSP Market Capitalization Acquired
Figure 1a
Annual Frequency of Mergers by Method of Payment
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YearPANEL A: Insider Trading by Firm Size
Size Deciles
Percentage of Net 
Buyers
Percentage of Net 
Sellers
Average / Median 
Size 
of Monthly Net 
Purchases ($)
Average / Median 
Size of Monthly 
Purchases through 
Option Exercises 
($)
Average Size
of Net Purchase 
(% of common 
stock holdings)
Average Size
of Purchases 
through Option 
Exercises
(% of common 
stock holdings)
1 72% 28% 12 0.7 2.70% 0.10%
40
2 64% 36% -1 4 0.14% 0.28%
40
3 58% 42% -23 5 -1.53% 0.27%
40
4 51% 49% -47 10 -2.29% 0.44%
30
5 47% 53% -88 17 -3.28% 0.55%
-6 0
6 41% 59% -163 35 -4.31% 0.80%
-24 0
7 35% 65% -292 61 -5.85% 1.00%
-54 0
8 30% 70% -474 109 -6.47% 1.25%
-97 0
9 26% 74% -678 229 -7.25% 2.06%
-151 0
10 18% 82% -1,826 841 -6.68% 2.30%
-260 0
PANEL B: Insider Trading by Managerial Position
Management Group
Percentage of Net 
Buyers
Percentage of Net 
Sellers
Average / Median 
Size 
of Net Purchase 
($)
Average / Median 
Size of Purchases 
through Option 
Exercises ($)
Average Size
of Net Purchase 
(% of common 
stock holdings)
Average Size
of Purchases 
through Option 
Exercises
(% of common 
stock holdings)
CEO 36% 64% -2,629 1,421 -15.73% 7.83%
-71 0
Directors 48% 52% -765 170 -4.31% 0.79%
-10 0
Officers 23% 77% -504 301 -13.74% 6.00%
-93 0
This table describes the average trading activity of different management groups for the entire 1984-2000 period. The management groups are constructed from the title
descriptions in the IDF database. I exclude the trades of large institutional shareholders and insiders who are not active in the management. 
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics - Insider Trading DataManagement Group N
Pre-Event
(1)
Post-Event
(2)
Reversal
(2) - (1) N
Pre-Event
(1)
Post-Event
(2)
Reversal
(2) - (1)
[-5,-1] [1,5] [-5,-1] [1,5]
CEOs 3,568 -2.5 *** 0.2       2.7 *** 6,151 2.2 *** -0.1       -2.2 ***
Directors 67,028 -1.2 *** 0.7 *** 1.9 *** 115,446 1.9 *** 0.2 *** -1.8 ***
Officers 28,604 -2.0 *** 1.1 *** 3.0 *** 140,088 2.1 *** 0.1 **  -2.0 ***
All Management Insiders 99,200 -1.5 *** 0.8 *** 2.2 *** 261,685 2.0 *** 0.1 *** -1.9 ***
[-10,-1] [1,10] [-10,-1] [1,10]
CEOs 3,565 -3.9 *** 0.1       4.0 *** 6,138 3.6 *** -0.1       -3.7 ***
Directors 66,818 -2.2 *** 1.1 *** 3.2 *** 115,153 3.1 *** 0.3 *** -2.9 ***
Officers 28,538 -3.1 *** 1.7 *** 4.8 *** 139,830 3.3 *** 0.1 **  -3.2 ***
All Management Insiders 98,921 -2.5 *** 1.2 *** 3.7 *** 261,121 3.2 *** 0.2 *** -3.0 ***
[-15,-1] [1,15] [-15,-1] [1,15]
CEOs 3,563 -5.6 *** 0.0       5.6 *** 6,132 5.2 *** -0.1       -5.3 ***
Directors 66,637 -2.9 *** 1.5 *** 4.3 *** 114,811 4.2 *** 0.2 *** -3.9 ***
Officers 28,469 -4.1 *** 2.2 *** 6.3 *** 139,579 4.4 *** 0.1 *    -4.3 ***
All Management Insiders 98,669 -3.3 *** 1.6 *** 5.0 *** 260,522 4.3 *** 0.2 **  -4.2 ***
This table describes the cumulative abnormal returns for 5, 10 and 15 day event windows around the insider transaction date (day 0). The abnormal returns are calculated by
subtracting the return on the CRSP value weighted index from firm returns during the event window. For each transaction day for each insider, the net value of trades by the
insider is calculated and the transaction day is labeled as a buy day or a sell day. Taking the transaction day as the event day (day 0), the abnormal returns are calculated for both
buy days and sell days. Average abnormal returns are calculated for each management group by averaging the abnormal returns following the buy and sell days of insiders in that
group. Standard errors are corrected for serial correlation by using  calendar date clustering.  Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
Table 4
Abnormal Returns on Insider Transactions by Managerial Position
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
PURCHASES SALES
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)Figure 2a
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Insider Sales
Figure 2b
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Insider Purchases
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
 
(
%
)
-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Event Days
CEOs
Officers
Directors
Open Market Sales
-
2
5
-
2
0
-
1
5
-
1
0
-
5
0
5
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
 
(
%
)
-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Event Days
CEOs
Officers
Directors
Open Market PurchasesTrade Size N
Pre-Event
(1)
Post-Event
(2)
Reversal
(2) - (1) N
Pre-Event
(1)
Post-Event
(2)
Reversal
(2) - (1)
[-5,-1] [1,5] [-5,-1] [1,5]
Absolute Measure: Number of shares
Small Trades (<10,000 shares) 90,182    -1.4*** 0.7*** 2.1 ***  191,931    1.8*** -0.0 -1.8 *** 
Big Trades (>=10,000 shares) 9,018      -1.7*** 1.5*** 3.2 ***  69,754      2.6*** 0.4*** -2.2 *** 
Relative Measure: Percentage of holdings
Small Trades (0-10%) 55,478    -1.2*** 0.7*** 1.9 ***  127,376    1.7*** 0.0 -1.7 *** 
Medium trades (10-30%) 19,560    -1.6*** 0.8*** 2.4 ***  56,511      2.0*** 0.2*** -1.8 *** 
Big Trades (>30%) 24,162    -1.9*** 0.9*** 2.8 ***  77,798      2.6*** 0.2*** -2.4 *** 
This table describes the cumulative abnormal returns for a 5 day event window around the insider transaction date (day 0) for different trade sizes. The abnormal returns are calculated by
subtracting the return on the CRSP value weighted index from firm returns during the event window. For each transaction day for each insider, the net value of trades by the insider is calculated
and the transaction day is labeled as a buy day or a sell day. Taking the transaction day as the event day (day 0), the abnormal returns are calculated for both buy days and sell days. Average
abnormal returns are calculated for each trade size group by averaging the abnormal returns following the buy and sell days of insiders in that group. Standard errors are corrected for serial
correlation by using  calendar date clustering.  Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
Table 5
Abnormal Returns on Insider Transactions by Trade Size
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
PURCHASES SALES
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)Figure 3a
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Insider Sales by Absolute Size
Figure 3b
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Insider Purchases by Absolute Size
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Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Insider Sales by Relative Size
Figure 4b
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Insider Purchases by Relative Size
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Open Market PurchasesIndependent Variables:
Intercept 73 (8.71)*** 50 (5.06)*** 3.8 (6.73)*** 3.1 (4.31)***
B/M-Decile
1 (Growth) -96 (38.88)*** -71 (22.31)*** -4.6 (25.08)*** -4.0 (16.43)***
2 -65 (41.96)*** -54 (23.71)*** -4.0 (27.91)*** -3.8 (17.49)***
3 -40 (34.64)*** -36 (19.83)*** -2.5 (20.72)*** -2.7 (15.23)***
4 -24 (25.34)*** -23 (15.53)*** -1.6 (15.01)*** -1.9 (12.07)***
5 -18 (21.51)*** -15 (11.26)*** -1.5 (13.83)*** -1.6 (10.39)***
6 -10 (13.33)*** -8 (6.63)*** -1.0 (9.72)*** -1.1 (7.76)***
7 -8 (12.05)*** -4 (3.88)*** -0.7 (7.46)*** -0.7 (5.18)***
8 -5 (7.88)*** -1 (1.22) -0.6 (6.09)*** -0.5 (3.41)***
9 -3 (5.96)*** 0 (0.38) -0.4 (4.78)*** -0.3 (2.23)**
10 (Value)
Dummy Variable = 1 if :
BAD Return in Quarter t+1 -49 (9.49)*** -40 (5.91)*** -3.6 (7.46)*** -2.6 (4.67)***
BAD Return in Quarter t+2 -49 (9.55)*** -41 (6.36)*** -3.8 (7.75)*** -2.8 (5.05)***
BAD Return in Quarter t+3 -33 (6.83)*** -25 (4.49)*** -2.1 (4.70)*** -1.7 (3.07)***
BAD Return in Quarter t+4 -41 (8.24)*** -31 (5.00)*** -1.9 (4.47)*** -1.7 (3.37)***
GOOD Return in Quarter t+1 5 (2.32)** 4 (1.56) 0.2 (0.91) 0.2 (0.56)
GOOD Return in Quarter t+2 5 (2.31)** 1 (0.43) 0.1 (0.44) 0.0 (0.05)
GOOD Return in Quarter t+3 2 (0.78) -5 (1.41) -0.2 (0.83) -0.4 (1.05)
GOOD Return in Quarter t+4 -5 (1.97)** -6 (1.59) -0.6 (2.20)** -0.5 (1.32)
Dollar Value of equity stake 0.0000 (2.05)** -0.0001 (2.56)** - - - -
Dollar Value of shares purchased through
option exercises during the last 12 months -0.0047 (2.79)*** -0.0148 (4.32)*** -0.0001 (2.39)** -0.0008 (4.13)***
Dollar Value of "Other" share purchases
during the last 12 months -0.0001 (1.41) -0.0002 (1.12) 0.0000 (5.88)*** 0.0000 (1.34)
Dollar Value of "Gift" share purchases
during the last 12 months -0.0008 (0.89) -0.0007 (0.33) 0.0000 (1.19) 0.0000 (0.29)
RETq(t-2),q(t) -64 (50.58)*** -46 (24.68)*** -5.1 (45.04)*** -3.7 (22.95)***
RETq(t-4),q(t-2) -40 (34.34)*** -26 (16.18)*** -2.9 (30.97)*** -2.0 (15.30)***
VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) -2 (2.66)*** 4 (4.53)*** 0.2 (2.67)*** 0.4 (4.49)***
VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) 12 (11.40)*** 5 (4.60)*** 0.4 (4.53)*** 0.2 (1.54)
Log of Total Assets -8 (27.29)*** -7 (15.94)*** -0.5 (23.17)*** -0.5 (15.36)***
Industry Dummies
Year-Quarter Dummies
R
2
Number of Observations
Test of Differences in Coefficients:
BAD Return in Quarter t+1 = GOOD Return in Quarter t+1
BAD Return in Quarter t+2 = GOOD Return in Quarter t+2
BAD Return in Quarter t+3 = GOOD Return in Quarter t+3
BAD Return in Quarter t+4 = GOOD Return in Quarter t+4
Yes
Yes
p-value
0.064
1,518,164
0.146
233,996
0.031
1,421,173
0.075
231,502
p-value
0.0128
<0.0001
<0.0001
  0.0040
0.0012
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.0004
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
  0.0501
0.0631
Purchases of
Company Stock
Table 6
Abnormal Trading Activity Prior to "Good" and "Bad" Returns - All Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dollar Value of
Individual Net
p-value p-value
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Averaged by 
Company Stock
Individual Net
Purchases of 
Company Stock as
Prior Exposure Firm-Quarters
Net Purchases of 
Company Stock as
Exposure Averaged by 
Firm-Quarters
Percentage of Prior
Dollar Value of Net
Purchases of 
Percentage of 
The purpose of this table is to see whether managers trade abnormally prior to extremely good and bad firm-specific events. A good event is proxied by a firm obtaining a  a market adjusted return of 30% or more in a 
single trading day. A bad event is proxied by a firm obtaining a  a market adjusted return of -30% or less in a single trading day. In models (1) and (2) the dependent variables are the quarterly dollar value of individual 
net stock purchases and the quarterly individual net stock purchases as a percentage of prior common stock holdings respectively. Net purchase is defined as the dollar value of  purchases minus sales. The dependent 
variables in models (2) and (4) are constructed by averaging the dependent variables in models (1) and (3) accross all managers in a given firm. Independent variables include book-to-market decile dummies, dummy 
variables showing whether there is an incidence of a "good" or a "bad" return in the following four quarters. Dollar value of equity stake is the number of common shares held at the beginning of the quarter times the 
beginning-of-the-quarter stock price. RETq(t-2),q(t) denotes stock return during the last two quarters. RETq(t-4),q(t-2) denotes the stock return during the two quarters before the last two quarters. VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) denotes the 
annualized stock return volatility during the two quarters before the last two quarter. VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) is the change in volatility between the last two quarters and the previous two quarters. Each regression 
includes industry and year-quarter dummies. Industries are defined using the 20 industry definition of Grinblatt and Moskovitz (1999). Coefficient estimates are reported first and robust t-statistics with clustering at the
manager (columns one and three) or firm level (columns two and four) second in each column. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. All dollar amounts are in thousands of 
2004 dollars.  Independent Variables:
Intercept 518 (4.93)*** 171 (4.85)*** 50.0 (1.89)* 7.5 (2.51)**
B/M-Decile
1 (Growth) -303 (6.99)*** -141 (9.03)*** -39.9 (4.03)*** -7.7 (5.49)***
2 -203 (5.72)*** -93 (7.77)*** -48.7 (5.28)*** -6.1 (5.20)***
3 -184 (6.07)*** -79 (6.86)*** -38.7 (4.38)*** -5.2 (4.59)***
4 -77 (3.07)*** -41 (4.37)*** -16.9 (2.61)*** -2.9 (2.86)***
5 -122 (4.29)*** -50 (4.83)*** -26.9 (4.04)*** -3.8 (3.53)***
6 -110 (4.08)*** -45 (4.52)*** -30.4 (4.10)*** -3.7 (3.50)***
7 -94 (3.54)*** -37 (4.12)*** -18.3 (3.45)*** -3.2 (3.16)***
8 -61 (2.79)*** -30 (3.16)*** -26.3 (3.38)*** -2.7 (2.44)**
9 -60 (2.78)*** -26 (3.11)*** -14.0 (2.35)** -2.5 (2.55)**
10 (Value)
Dummy Variable = 1 if :
BAD Return in Quarter t+1 -101 (0.70) -65 (1.38) -24.2 (0.79) -5.5 (1.53)
BAD Return in Quarter t+2 -91 (0.71) -66 (1.74)* -97.0 (1.71)* -4.5 (1.18)
BAD Return in Quarter t+3 -239 (1.32) -76 (1.72)* -58.2 (1.30) -6.5 (1.56)
BAD Return in Quarter t+4 49 (0.43) -64 (1.26) 20.2 (0.68) -1.1 (0.32)
GOOD Return in Quarter t+1 53 (1.61) 0 (0.02) -1.7 (0.09) -0.9 (0.44)
GOOD Return in Quarter t+2 97 (2.71)*** 20 (1.08) -0.4 (0.02) 1.8 (0.94)
GOOD Return in Quarter t+3 123 (2.77)*** 23 (0.95) 14.6 (0.76) 3.0 (1.68)*
GOOD Return in Quarter t+4 68 (1.38) -18 (0.54) -29.8 (0.79) 0.4 (0.18)
Dollar Value of equity stake -0.001 (2.67)*** 0.000 (5.20)*** - - - -
Intrinsic value of exercisible options -0.002 (0.57) -0.001 (0.76) -0.001 (0.79) 0.000 (0.17)
Intrinsic value of unexercisible options -0.011 (2.25)** -0.002 (2.47)** 0.001 (1.43) 0.000 (0.82)
Dollar Value of stock grants -0.012 (0.37) 0.001 (0.11) 0.013 (3.12)*** 0.001 (2.17)**
Dollar Value of Total compensation -0.081 (2.46)** -0.007 (1.19) 0.007 (1.84)* -0.001 (0.69)
Black-Scholes value of option grants -0.003 (0.25) 0.001 (0.29) -0.002 (0.87) 0.000 (0.81)
RETq(t-2),q(t) -271 (9.07)*** -110 (11.54)*** -42.8 (5.45)*** -9.0 (10.12)***
RETq(t-4),q(t-2) -195 (5.02)*** -81 (7.75)*** -23.8 (2.53)** -4.9 (5.84)***
VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) -346 (5.02)*** -127 (4.89)*** -52.0 (3.47)*** -9.0 (4.20)***
VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) 226 (3.05)*** 60 (2.78)*** 21.2 (1.40) 3.0 (1.60)
Log of Total Assets -36 (4.37)*** -9 (3.44)*** -3.7 (2.15)** -0.4 (1.98)**
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 0.148 27.4% 0.041 0.161
Number of Observations 13028 10301 11994 10287
Test of Differences in Coefficients:
BAD Return in Quarter t+1 = GOOD Return in Quarter t+1
BAD Return in Quarter t+2 = GOOD Return in Quarter t+2
BAD Return in Quarter t+3 = GOOD Return in Quarter t+3
BAD Return in Quarter t+4 = GOOD Return in Quarter t+4
Net Purchases of 
Company Stock as
Exposure Averaged by 
Firm-Quarters
Percentage of Prior Company Stock
Individual Net
Purchases of 
Company Stock as
Dollar Value of Net
Purchases of 
p-value p-value p-value
Averaged by 
Prior Exposure Firm-Quarters
Percentage of 
Purchases of
Company Stock
Table 7
Abnormal Trading Activity Prior to "Good" and "Bad" Returns - Top Managers - 1991 - 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dollar Value of
Individual Net
0.2107
0.0443
0.0563
0.4762
0.300
0.1569
0.0535
0.8884
p-value
0.3355
0.2376
0.1387
0.0441
0.7284
0.5265
0.1134
0.1499
The purpose of this table is to see whether top managers trade abnormally prior to extremely good and bad firm-specific events. A good event is proxied by a firm obtaining a  a market adjusted return of 30% or more 
in a single trading day. A bad event is proxied by a firm obtaining a  a market adjusted return of -30% or less in a single trading day. In models (1) and (2) the dependent variables are the quarterly dollar value of 
individual net stock purchases and the quarterly individual net stock purchases as a percentage of prior common stock holdings respectively. Net purchase is defined as the dollar value of purchases minus sales. The 
dependent variables in models (2) and (4) are constructed by averaging the dependent variables in models (1) and (3) accross all top-managers in a given firm. Independent variables include book-to-market decile 
dummies, dummy variables showing whether there is an incidence of a "good" or a "bad" return in the following four quarters. Dollar value of equity stake is the number of common shares held at the beginning of the 
quarter times the beginning-of-the-quarter stock price. RETq(t-2),q(t) denotes stock return during the last two quarters. RETq(t-4),q(t-2) denotes the stock return during the two quarters before the last two quarters. VOLq(t-
4),q(t-2) denotes the annualized stock return volatility during the two quarters before the last two quarter. VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) is the change in volatility between the last two quarters and the previous two quarters. 
Each regression includes industry and year-quarter dummies. Industries are defined using the 20 industry definition of Grinblatt and Moskovitz (1999).  Coefficient estimates are reported first and robust t-statistics 
with clustering at the manager (columns one and three) or firm level (columns two and four) second in each column. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. All dollar 
amounts are in thousands of 2004 dollars.Independent Variables:
Intercept 70 (8.44)*** 47 (4.81)*** 4 (6.55)*** 3 (4.08)***
B/M-Decile
1 (Growth) -96 (39.23)*** -70 (22.48)*** -4.6 (25.37)*** -4.0 (16.63)***
2 -65 (42.13)*** -54 (23.76)*** -4.0 (28.04)*** -3.8 (17.52)***
3 -40 (34.55)*** -35 (19.69)*** -2.5 (20.74)*** -2.7 (15.12)***
4 -23 (24.92)*** -22 (15.22)*** -1.6 (14.88)*** -1.9 (11.88)***
5 -18 (21.02)*** -14 (10.90)*** -1.5 (13.68)*** -1.5 (10.19)***
6 -9 (12.70)*** -7 (6.18)*** -0.9 (9.52)*** -1.1 (7.52)***
7 -8 (11.42)*** -4 (3.44)*** -0.7 (7.26)*** -0.7 (4.96)***
8 -5 (7.51)*** -1 (0.83) -0.6 (5.96)*** -0.4 (3.23)***
9 -3 (5.71)*** 0 (0.06) -0.4 (4.68)*** -0.3 (2.08)**
10 (Value)
Dummy Variable = 1 if :
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+1 -63 (4.66)*** -82 (3.10)*** -1.6 (1.61) -4.3 (2.24)**
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+2 -69 (5.16)*** -97 (3.67)*** -3.7 (3.26)*** -6.2 (2.97)***
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+3 -76 (5.48)*** -85 (3.55)*** -3.9 (3.50)*** -4.5 (2.42)**
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+4 -55 (4.47)*** -65 (2.65)*** -3.5 (3.21)*** -4.9 (2.25)**
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+1 -28 (1.72)* -29 (0.86) -1.9 (1.35) -2.6 (0.91)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+2 1 (0.05) 2 (0.07) -0.5 (0.37) 0.4 (0.17)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+3 -45 (2.59)*** -52 (1.47) -2.7 (1.97)** -2.7 (1.05)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+4 -55 (3.17)*** -63 (1.66)* -2.9 (2.00)** -2.7 (0.93)
BAD Target in Quarter t+1 -4 (0.23) 7 (0.48) 0.8 (0.47) 2.3 (1.22)
BAD Target in Quarter t+2 -156 (4.20)*** -118 (2.13)** -4.5 (1.87)* -6.5 (1.56)
BAD Target in Quarter t+3 -19 (1.26) -16 (0.81) -1.4 (0.78) -0.1 (0.04)
BAD Target in Quarter t+4 -69 (2.85)*** -69 (1.67)* -6.4 (2.53)** -10.5 (1.98)**
GOOD Target in Quarter t+1 -4 (1.21) -9 (1.56) -0.1 (0.41) -0.4 (0.83)
GOOD Target in Quarter t+2 -2 (0.77) -7 (1.24) -0.9 (2.70)*** -0.8 (1.55)
GOOD Target in Quarter t+3 -3 (0.96) -8 (1.58) -0.7 (2.19)** -0.5 (1.10)
GOOD Target in Quarter t+4 -4 (1.33) -3 (0.66) -1.6 (4.59)*** -1.2 (2.37)**
Dollar Value of equity stake 0.0001 (2.04)** -0.0001 (2.55)** - - - -
Dollar Value of shares purchased through
option exercises during the last 12 months -0.0047 (2.79)*** -0.0146 (4.27)*** -0.0001 (2.39)** -0.00076 (4.09)***
Dollar Value of "Other" share purchases
during the last 12 months -0.0001 (1.32) -0.0002 (1.06) 0.00001 (6.37)*** 0.00001 (1.35)
Dollar Value of "Gift" share purchases
during the last 12 months -0.0008 (0.89) -0.0007 (0.34) 0.00003 (1.19) 0.00003 (0.28)
RETq(t-2),q(t) -64 (50.67)*** -45 (24.70)*** -5.1 (45.07)*** -3.6 (22.96)***
RETq(t-4),q(t-2) -40 (34.42)*** -26 (16.21)*** -2.9 (30.99)*** -2.0 (15.30)***
VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) -2 (2.51)** 4 (4.88)*** 0.2 (2.66)*** 0.4 (4.68)***
VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) 11 (11.32)*** 5 (4.45)*** 0.4 (4.49)*** 0.2 (1.42)
Log of Total Assets -7 (26.69)*** -7 (15.57)*** -0.4 (22.57)*** -0.5 (14.95)***
Industry Dummies
Year-Quarter Dummies
R
2
Number of Observations
F-Test for Differences in Coefficients:
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+1 = GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+1
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+2 = GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+2
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+3 = GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+3
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+4 = GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+4
BAD Target in Quarter t+1 = GOOD Target in Quarter t+1
BAD Target in Quarter t+2 = GOOD Target in Quarter t+2
BAD Target in Quarter t+3 = GOOD Target in Quarter t+3
BAD Target in Quarter t+4 = GOOD Target in Quarter t+4
0.166
0.172
0.788
0.082
0.625
0.036
0.580
0.560
0.592
0.138
0.709
0.061
0.298
0.047
0.698
0.110
Prior Exposure Firm-Quarters
Net Purchases of 
Company Stock as
Exposure Averaged by 
Firm-Quarters
Percentage of Prior
Dollar Value of Net
Purchases of 
Percentage of  Averaged by 
Company Stock
Individual Net
Purchases of 
Company Stock as
p-value p-value
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Purchases of
Company Stock
Table 8
Abnormal Trading Activity Prior to "Good" and "Bad" Mergers - All Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dollar Value of
Individual Net
0.091
0.000
0.170
0.999
0.990
0.000
0.299
0.008
231,502
p-value
0.178
0.006
0.439
0.971
0.884
0.061
0.504
0.748
Yes
Yes
p-value
0.064
1,518,164
0.146
233,996
0.031
1,421,173
0.075
The purpose of this table is to see whether acquirer and target firm managers trade abnormally prior to good and bad mergers. A good merger for an acquirer (target) manager is one in which the acquirer's (target's) 4-
day announcement cumulative abnormal return is higher than 10%. A bad merger for an acquirer (target) manager is one in which the acquirer's (target's) 4-day announcement cumulative abnormal return is less than -
10%. This procedure yields 154 bad mergers and 80 good mergers for acquirer managers, and 57 bad mergers and 1,261 good mergers for the target managers. In models (1) and (2) the dependent variables are the 
quarterly dollar value of individual net stock purchases and the quarterly individual net stock purchases as a percentage of prior common stock holdings respectively. Net purchase is defined as the dollar value of 
purchases minus sales. The dependent variables in models (2) and (4) are constructed by averaging the dependent variables in models (1) and (3) across all the managers in a given firm. Independent variables include 
book-to-market decile dummies, dummy variables showing whether the firm is a good acquirer, bad acquirer, good target or a bad target in the four quarters following the merger. p-values for F-tests for the equality of 
the coefficients of these dummy variables are presented at the bottom of the table. Dollar value of equity stake is the number of common shares held at the beginning of the quarter times the beginning-of-the-quarter 
stock price. RETq(t-2),q(t) denotes stock return during the last two quarters. RET q(t-4),q(t-2) denotes the stock return during the two quarters before the last two quarters. VOL q(t-4),q(t-2) denotes the annualized stock return 
volatility during the two quarters before the last two quarter. VOL q(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) is the change in volatility between the last two quarters and the previous two quarters. Each regression includes industry and year-
quarter dummies. Industries are defined using the 20 industry definition of Grinblatt and Moskovitz (1999). Coefficient estimates are reported first and robust t-statistics with clustering at the manager (columns one and 
three) or firm level (columns two and four) second in each column. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. All dollar amounts are in thousands of 2004 dollars.  Seyhun's
Sample 1983-1986
Seyhun's
Sample 1983-1986
Boehmer and
Netter's sample 1983-1987
Boehmer and
Netter's sample 1983-1987
Independent Variables:
Intercept 34 (3.85)*** 3.2 (4.93)*** 26 (3.11)*** 2.4 (3.99)***
B/M-Decile
1 (Growth) -84 (14.07)*** -2.9 (10.11)*** -79 (14.74)*** -2.5 (10.40)***
2 -50 (13.76)*** -2.1 (8.41)*** -49 (16.57)*** -1.8 (8.48)***
3 -33 (10.82)*** -1.5 (6.45)*** -31 (13.39)*** -1.3 (6.22)***
4 -24 (8.96)*** -1.6 (7.04)*** -22 (11.57)*** -1.1 (5.23)***
5 -19 (7.94)*** -1.1 (4.93)*** -18 (9.87)*** -0.7 (3.55)***
6 -10 (4.52)*** -0.8 (3.51)*** -12 (7.00)*** -0.6 (2.72)***
7 -6 (2.88)*** -0.6 (2.86)*** -7 (4.76)*** -0.5 (2.29)**
8 -3 (1.67)* -0.5 (2.47)** -3 (2.60)*** -0.3 (1.57)
9 1 (0.70) -0.9 (4.08)*** -1 (0.51) -0.5 (2.82)***
10 (Value)
Dummy Variable = 1 if :
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+1 19 (1.79)* 1.6 (1.53) -17 (0.89) 0.0 (0.04)
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+2 -72 (1.18) -1.3 (0.37) -79 (1.73)* -3.6 (1.37)
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+3 -50 (1.22) -0.4 (0.31) -84 (1.74)* -0.7 (0.57)
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+4 -56 (1.60) -4.6 (1.48) -55 (1.59) -4.6 (1.46)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+1 1 (0.17) 0.1 (0.08) 5 (0.24) 0.7 (0.28)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+2 -2 (0.06) -0.3 (0.09) 8 (0.44) 0.4 (0.16)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+3 -21 (0.90) -3.3 (1.16) -20 (0.86) -3.7 (1.30)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+4 -1 (0.04) 0.4 (0.18) -2 (0.09) 0.2 (0.08)
BAD Target in Quarter t+1 35 (5.54)*** 3.8 (7.87)*** 26 (5.64)*** 3.3 (9.00)***
BAD Target in Quarter t+2 54 (13.22)*** 3.0 (14.23)*** 46 (14.53)*** 3.1 (17.22)***
BAD Target in Quarter t+3 -345 (1.33) 1.2 (1.58) -353 (1.34) 1.2 (1.59)
BAD Target in Quarter t+4 -12 (0.32) 0.5 (0.36) -18 (0.53) 0.5 (0.34)
GOOD Target in Quarter t+1 4 (0.30) -1.4 (1.34) -11 (1.01) -1.2 (1.66)*
GOOD Target in Quarter t+2 8 (0.93) -0.8 (0.66) 11 (2.17)** -0.1 (0.10)
GOOD Target in Quarter t+3 1 (0.10) 0.3 (0.26) -4 (0.45) 0.3 (0.46)
GOOD Target in Quarter t+4 -12 (1.07) -3.2 (2.39)** -8 (0.89) -2.0 (2.24)**
Dollar Value of equity stake -0.0004 (3.35)*** 0.0001 (0.87)
Dollar Value of shares purchased 
through
option exercises during the last 12 
months 0.133 (0.99) 0.02120 (1.55) 0.1084 (1.08) -0.0409 (0.73)
Dollar Value of "Other" share 
purchases
during the last 12 months 0.000 (0.21) 0.00001 (5.75)*** -0.0003 (3.05)*** 0.0001 (6.81)***
Dollar Value of "Gift" share purchases
during the last 12 months -0.014 (3.88)*** 0.00012 (2.25)** -0.0145 (4.07)*** 0.0001 (1.93)*
RETq(t-2),q(t) -37 (11.17)*** -1.1 (6.21)*** -34 (14.61)*** -1.2 (9.25)***
RETq(t-4),q(t-2) -24 (6.54)*** -0.2 (1.29) -18 (7.17)*** -0.1 (1.18)
VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) 3 (1.06) -0.2 (0.89) 4 (2.37)** -0.2 (1.41)
VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) -1 (0.35) 0.0 (0.18) -1 (0.75) -0.1 (0.76)
Log of Total Assets -4 (9.01)*** -0.5 (17.10)*** -4 (9.78)*** -0.5 (19.15)***
Industry Dummies
Year-Quarter Dummies
R
2
Number of Observations
0.033
122,413
0.013
118,054
0.026
194,202
0.016
186,868
Yes
Yes
Purchases of
Company Stock
Table 9
Abnormal Trading Activity Prior to "Good" and "Bad" Mergers - All Managers - Comparison with the Literature
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dollar Value of
Individual Net
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Percentage of 
Company Stock as
Dollar Value of
Individual Net
Purchases of
Prior Exposure
Individual Net
Purchases of 
Percentage of 
Prior Exposure
Company Stock as
Individual Net
Purchases of 
Company Stock
The purpose of this table is to see whether acquirer and target firm managers trade abnormally prior to good and bad mergers and to compare our results with the literature Sample is limited to 
1983-1986 to overlap with Seyhun (1990b)'s sample in columns (1) and (2).  Sample is limited to 1983-1987 to overlap with Boehmer and Netter (1997)'s sample in columns (3) and (4).A good 
merger for an acquirer (target) manager is one in which the acquirer's (target's) 4-day announcement cumulative abnormal return is higher than 10%. A bad merger for an acquirer (target) 
manager is one in which the acquirer's (target's) 4-day announcement cumulative abnormal return is less than -10%. In models (1) and (3) the dependent variables are the quarterly dollar value of 
individual net stock purchases. In models (2) and (4) the dependent variables are the quarterly individual net stock purchases as a percentage of prior common stock holdings. Net purchase is 
defined as the dollar value of purchases minus sales. Independent variables include book-to-market decile dummies, dummy variables showing whether the firm is a good acquirer, bad acquirer, 
good target or a bad target in the four quarters following the merger. Dollar value of equity stake is the number of common shares held at the beginning of the quarter times the beginning-of-the-
quarter stock price. RETq(t-2),q(t) denotes stock return during the last two quarters. RETq(t-4),q(t-2) denotes the stock return during the two quarters before the last two quarters. VOLq(t-4),q(t-
2) denotes the annualized stock return volatility during the two quarters before the last two quarter. VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) is the change in volatility between the last two quarters and 
the previous two quarters. Each regression includes industry and year-quarter dummies. Industries are defined using the 20 industry definition of Grinblatt and Moskovitz (1999). Coefficient 
estimates are reported first and robust t-statistics with clustering at the manager level second in each column. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
All dollar amounts are in thousands of 2004 dollars.  Independent Variables:
Intercept 70 (8.45)*** -240 (6.38)***
B/M-Decile
1 (Growth) -96 (39.36)*** 141 (6.28)***
2 -65 (42.18)*** 57 (6.04)***
3 -39 (34.47)*** 32 (5.36)***
4 -23 (24.85)*** 24 (2.51)**
5 -18 (20.99)*** 17 (4.37)***
6 -9 (12.55)*** 3 (1.42)
7 -8 (11.41)*** 8 (4.12)***
8 -5 (7.40)*** 7 (3.35)***
9 -3 (5.50)*** 6 (3.55)***
10 (Value)
Dummy Variable = 1 if :
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t-1 3 (0.24) -212 (2.67)***
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t-2 -32 (2.55)** 159 (1.35)
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t-3 -60 (4.05)*** 174 (1.34)
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t-4 -40 (3.04)*** -61 (1.01)
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+1 -62 (4.65)*** 262 (2.12)**
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+2 -69 (5.16)*** 638 (2.91)***
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+3 -76 (5.51)*** 137 (1.88)*
BAD Acquirer in Quarter t+4 -56 (4.48)*** 277 (2.12)**
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t-1 -11 (0.62) 630 (1.85)*
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t-2 -45 (2.27)** -170 (0.77)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t-3 -59 (3.15)*** 717 (1.92)*
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t-4 -15 (0.91) 997 (1.63)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+1 -27 (1.69)* 460 (1.26)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+2 0 (0.02) 300 (1.14)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+3 -45 (2.60)*** 247 (1.12)
GOOD Acquirer in Quarter t+4 -55 (3.12)*** 303 (1.91)*
Dollar Value of equity stake 0 (2.05)** 0 (0.84)
Dollar Value of shares purchased 
through
option exercises during the last 12 
months 0 (2.78)*** 0 (3.71)***
Dollar Value of "Other" share purchases
during the last 12 months 0 (1.33) 0 (1.02)
Dollar Value of "Gift" share purchases
during the last 12 months 0 (0.89) 0 (0.83)
RETq(t-2),q(t) -64 (50.48)*** 93 (17.95)***
RETq(t-4),q(t-2) -40 (34.52)*** 64 (6.67)***
VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) -2 (2.48)** 39 (6.14)***
VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) 12 (11.34)*** -45 (6.87)***
Log of Total Assets -7 (27.03)*** 25 (6.29)***
Industry Dummies
Year-Quarter Dummies
R
2
Number of Observations
0.06
1,518,164
0.08
1,518,164
Purchases of
Company Stock
Table 10
Abnormal Option Exercises Prior to "Good" and "Bad" Mergers - All Managers
(1) (2)
Dollar Value of
Individual Net
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Through Option
Company Stock
Exercises
Dollar Value of Individual
Purchases of 
The purpose of this table is to see whether insiders abnormally change their purchases through stock option exercises prior to good and 
bad mergers. A good merger for an acquirer (target) manager is one in which the acquirer's (target's) 4-day announcement cumulative 
abnormal return is higher than 10%. A bad merger for an acquirer (target) manager is one in which the acquirer's (target's) 4-day 
announcement cumulative abnormal return is less than -10%. In model (1) the dependent variable is the quarterly dollar value of 
individual net stock purchases. In model (2) the dependent variable is the dollar value of individual purchases of company stock through
option exercises. Independent variables include book-to-market decile dummies, dummy variables showing whether the firm is a good 
acquirer, bad acquirer, good target or a bad target in the four quarters following the merger and in the four quarters preceding the 
merger. Dollar value of equity stake is the number of common shares held at the beginning of the quarter times the beginning-of-the-
quarter stock price. RETq(t-2),q(t) denotes stock return during the last two quarters. RETq(t-4),q(t-2) denotes the stock return during the
two quarters before the last two quarters. VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) denotes the annualized stock return volatility during the two quarters before 
the last two quarter. VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) is the change in volatility between the last two quarters and the previous two 
quarters. Each regression includes industry and year-quarter dummies. Industries are defined using the 20 industry definition of 
Grinblatt and Moskovitz (1999). Coefficient estimates are reported first and robust t-statistics with clustering at the manager level 
second in each column. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. All dollar amounts are in 
thousands of 2004 dollars.  (4)
Independent Variables:
Intercept 70 (8.38)*** 47 (4.77)*** 4.0 (6.48)*** 3.0 (4.05)***
B/M-Decile
1 (Growth) -96 (39.16)*** -70 (22.42)*** -4.6 (25.26)*** -4.0 (16.57)***
2 -65 (42.06)*** -54 (23.71)*** -4.0 (27.95)*** -3.7 (17.49)***
3 -39 (34.32)*** -35 (19.56)*** -2.5 (20.56)*** -2.6 (15.04)***
4 -23 (24.83)*** -22 (15.17)*** -1.6 (14.79)*** -1.9 (11.85)***
5 -18 (20.87)*** -14 (10.81)*** -1.4 (13.55)*** -1.5 (10.14)***
6 -9 (12.38)*** -7 (5.98)*** -0.9 (9.30)*** -1.0 (7.41)***
7 -8 (11.20)*** -3 (3.28)*** -0.7 (7.12)*** -0.7 (4.89)***
8 -5 (7.52)*** -1 (0.76) -0.6 (5.93)*** -0.4 (3.20)***
9 -3 (5.87)*** 0 (0.12) -0.4 (4.73)*** -0.3 (2.11)**
10 (Value)
Dummy Variable = 1 if :
Acquirer of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+1 -11 (2.93)*** -15 (1.83)* 0.0 (0.00) -0.5 (0.82)
Acquirer of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+2 -24 (6.58)*** -32 (3.75)*** -1.3 (4.13)*** -2.0 (2.84)***
Acquirer of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+3 -24 (6.56)*** -34 (4.18)*** -1.2 (3.70)*** -2.2 (3.06)***
Acquirer of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+4 -13 (4.04)*** -25 (2.88)*** -0.8 (3.02)*** -1.9 (2.54)**
…
Acquirer of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+1 3 (0.74) -3 (0.32) 0.0 (0.05) -0.6 (0.81)
Acquirer of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+2 -11 (2.32)** -19 (1.90)* -0.5 (1.30) -1.1 (1.29)
Acquirer of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+3 3 (0.76) 0 (0.04) 0.6 (1.51) 0.1 (0.15)
Acquirer of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+4 2 (0.53) -1 (0.12) -0.2 (0.51) -0.5 (0.61)
Target of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+1 -19 (4.63)*** -23 (2.95)*** -1.4 (3.64)*** -1.4 (2.18)**
Target of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+2 -22 (5.36)*** -28 (3.33)*** -1.9 (4.89)*** -2.1 (3.36)***
Target of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+3 -9 (2.36)** -15 (2.49)** -0.7 (1.91)* -0.9 (1.74)*
Target of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+4 -12 (3.48)*** -12 (2.06)** -3.0 (7.05)*** -2.4 (3.55)***
…
Target of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+1 9 (2.48)** 8 (1.71)* 0.4 (0.76) 0.2 (0.30)
Target of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+2 2 (0.52) -4 (0.52) 0.0 (0.02) -0.2 (0.21)
Target of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+3 -7 (1.26) 1 (0.08) -1.4 (2.08)** -0.9 (1.02)
Target of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+4 -0.2 (0.03) 1 (0.11) 0.2 (0.28) 0.0 (0.00)
Dollar Value of equity stake 0.00001 (2.04)** -0.0001 (2.52)** - - - -
Dollar Value of shares purchased through
option exercises during the last 12 months -0.005 (2.79)*** -0.0147 (4.28)*** -0.00010 (2.39)** -0.0008 (4.10)***
Dollar Value of "Other" share purchases
during the last 12 months 0.000 (1.37) -0.0002 (1.10) 0.00001 (6.10)*** 0.00001 (1.34)
Dollar Value of "Gift" share purchases
during the last 12 months -0.001 (0.89) -0.0007 (0.33) 0.00003 (1.20) 0.00001 (0.29)
RETq(t-2),q(t) -64 (50.65)*** -45 (24.68)*** -5 (45.07)*** -4 (22.95)***
RETq(t-4),q(t-2) -40 (34.41)*** -26 (16.17)*** -3 (31.02)*** -2 (15.30)***
VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) -2 (2.39)** 4 (4.95)*** 0.22 (2.76)*** 0.4 (4.71)***
VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) 12 (11.29)*** 5 (4.41)*** 0.38 (4.45)*** 0.2 (1.40)
Log of Total Assets -7 (26.57)*** -7 (15.49)*** -0.44 (22.50)*** -1 (14.90)***
Industry Dummies
Year-Quarter Dummies
R
2
N
F-Test for Differences in Coefficients:
Acquirer-STOCK-q(t+1) = Acquirer-CASH-q(t+1)
Acquirer-STOCK-q(t+1) = Acquirer-CASH-q(t+1)
Acquirer-STOCK-q(t+1) = Acquirer-CASH-q(t+1)
Acquirer-STOCK-q(t+1) = Acquirer-CASH-q(t+1)
Target-STOCK-q(t+1) = Target-CASH-q(t+1)
Target-STOCK-q(t+1) = Target-CASH-q(t+1)
Target-STOCK-q(t+1) = Target-CASH-q(t+1)
Target-STOCK-q(t+1) = Target-CASH-q(t+1)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
p-value
0.063
1,518,164
0.145
233,996
0.031
1,421,173
0.075
231,502
0.0365
0.0773
0.1189
p-value p-value
0.2780
0.0025
0.0516
0.0006  0.0832
0.0405
0.9901
0.0144
 0.8901
 0.4422
0.0269
 0.2422
0.0118
0.0230
0.0000
p-value
0.0043
<0.0001
0.0001
0.7786
0.0512
 0.9713
 0.1531
0.0005
 0.2217
0.0044
0.0033
0.3284
<0.0001
0.2572
Purchases of
Company Stock
Table 11
Abnormal Trading Activity Prior to Stock and Cash Merger Announcements - All Managers
(1) (2) (3)
Dollar Value of
Individual Net
Company Stock
Averaged by 
Prior Exposure Firm-Quarters
Percentage of 
Individual Net
Purchases of 
Company Stock as
Dollar Value of Net
Purchases of 
Net Purchases of 
Company Stock as
Exposure Averaged by 
Firm-Quarters
Percentage of Prior
The purpose of this table is to see whether acquirer and target firm managers trade abnormally prior to stock and cash mergers. To achieve this goal, dummy variables are created showing whether  the firm will be 
an acquirer or a target in a stock, cash or a mixed acquisition during the next four quarters. The dummies for mixed acquisitions are included in all models but are not reported below for brevity. In models (1) and 
(3) the dependent variables are the quarterly dollar value of individual net stock purchases and the quarterly individual net stock purchases as a percentage of prior common stock holdings respectively. Net purchase 
is defined as the dollar value of purchases minus sales. The dependent variables in models (2) and (4) are constructed by averaging the dependent variables in models (1) and (3) across all managers in a given firm.  
Dollar value of equity stake is the number of common shares held at the beginning of the quarter times the beginning-of-the-quarter stock price. RET q(t-2),q(t) denotes stock return during the last two quarters. RET q(t-
4),q(t-2) denotes the stock return during the two quarters before the last two quarters. VOL q(t-4),q(t-2) denotes the annualized stock return volatility during the two quarters before the last two quarter. VOL q(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-
4),q(t-2) is the change in volatility between the last two quarters and the previous two quarters. Each regression includes industry and year-quarter dummies. Industries are defined using the 20 industry definition of 
Grinblatt and Moskovitz (1999).  Coefficient estimates are reported first and robust t-statistics with clustering at the manager (columns one and three) or firm level (columns two and four) second in each column. 
Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. All dollar amounts are in thousands of 2004 dollars.Independent Variables:
Intercept 480 (4.58)*** 163 (4.61)*** 45.9 (1.74)* 7.4 (2.45)**
B/M-Decile
1 (Growth) -289 (6.70)*** -140 (9.03)*** -40.0 (4.04)*** -7.7 (5.57)***
2 -191 (5.59)*** -92 (7.71)*** -49.0 (5.20)*** -6.2 (5.29)***
3 -167 (5.43)*** -76 (6.69)*** -38.0 (4.27)*** -5.2 (4.55)***
4 -69 (2.73)*** -40 (4.18)*** -17.1 (2.58)** -3.0 (2.88)***
5 -110 (3.86)*** -48 (4.56)*** -26.7 (3.94)*** -3.8 (3.49)***
6 -96 (3.47)*** -42 (4.20)*** -30.2 (3.96)*** -3.7 (3.45)***
7 -81 (3.21)*** -35 (3.83)*** -17.8 (3.19)*** -3.2 (3.12)***
8 -53 (2.43)** -29 (3.07)*** -26.7 (3.39)*** -2.7 (2.47)**
9 -60 (2.83)*** -26 (3.09)*** -14.6 (2.40)** -2.6 (2.60)***
10 (Value)
Dummy Variable = 1 if :
Acquirer of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+1 -36 (0.41) -15 (0.82) -8.2 (0.35) 0.3 (0.22)
Acquirer of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+2 -167 (1.66)* -31 (1.64) -5.2 (0.27) 0.2 (0.13)
Acquirer of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+3 -280 (2.52)** -21 (1.14) -22.3 (0.91) -1.0 (0.61)
Acquirer of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+4 -8 (0.10) -15 (0.75) 2.3 (0.15) -2.2 (1.24)
…
Acquirer of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+1 -368 (2.01)** -73 (1.84)* -27.3 (0.85) -1.3 (0.48)
Acquirer of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+2 -308 (1.49) -10 (0.29) -13.4 (0.40) 0.4 (0.15)
Acquirer of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+3 117 (0.99) 19 (0.72) 17.1 (1.12) -2.3 (0.77)
Acquirer of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+4 43 (0.29) 37 (1.12) -27.9 (0.72) -1.6 (0.52)
Target of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+1 -98 (1.15) -38 (1.29) -11.8 (0.55) -1.0 (0.47)
Target of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+2 -169 (1.58) -70 (1.99)** -19.5 (0.75) -5.2 (2.18)**
Target of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+3 -148 (1.35) -51 (1.43) -27.9 (0.91) -2.2 (0.87)
Target of STOCK acquisition in Quarter t+4 -91 (0.86) -55 (1.39) -62.4 (1.50) -5.7 (1.77)*
…
Target of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+1 100 (2.40)** 33 (1.23) -8.0 (0.23) 0.2 (0.06)
Target of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+2 76 (0.90) 19 (0.74) -45.2 (0.66) 0.4 (0.17)
Target of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+3 -187 (0.82) -51 (0.60) -117.0 (1.26) -8.1 (0.94)
Target of CASH acquisition in Quarter t+4 52 (0.27) -3 (0.04) 48.7 (3.31)*** 1.4 (0.22)
Dollar Value of equity stake -0.0007 (2.67)*** -0.0001 (5.16)*** - - - -
Intrinsic value of exercisible options -0.0019 (0.55) -0.0005 (0.72) -0.0004 (0.76) 0.0000 (0.12)
Intrinsic value of unexercisible options -0.0102 (2.21)** -0.0020 (2.42)** 0.0012 (1.47) 0.0000 (0.81)
Dollar Value of stock grants -0.0153 (0.46) 0.0007 (0.09) 0.0125 (3.06)*** 0.0012 (2.07)**
Dollar Value of Total compensation -0.1000 (2.58)** -0.0076 (1.30) 0.0100 (1.77)* -0.0006 (0.70)
Black-Scholes value of option grants 0.0000 (0.31) 0.0004 (0.24) -0.0015 (0.92) -0.0001 (0.80)
RETq(t-2),q(t) -271 (9.23)*** -110 (11.65)*** -43.5 (5.61)*** -9.0 (10.26)***
RETq(t-4),q(t-2) -194 (5.02)*** -82 (7.81)*** -24.0 (2.53)** -4.9 (5.90)***
VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) -338 (4.94)*** -125 (4.81)*** -50.5 (3.39)*** -8.9 (4.18)***
VOLq(t-2),q(t) - VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) 224 (3.05)*** 60 (2.78)*** 20.2 (1.34) 3.1 (1.63)
Log of Total Assets -32 (3.82)*** -8 (3.04)*** -3.3 (1.91)* -0.4 (1.77)*
Industry Dummies
Year-Quarter Dummies
R
2
N
0.042
11,994
0.162
10,287
0.152
13,028 10,301
0.275
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Net Purchases of 
Company Stock as
Exposure Averaged by 
Firm-Quarters
Percentage of Prior Company Stock
Individual Net
Purchases of 
Company Stock as
Dollar Value of Net
Purchases of 
Averaged by 
Prior Exposure Firm-Quarters
Percentage of 
Yes
Yes
Yes
Purchases of
Company Stock
Table 12
Abnormal Trading Activity Prior to Merger Announcements - Top Managers -1991-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dollar Value of
Individual Net
The purpose of this table is to see whether acquirer and target firm top-managers trade abnormally prior to stock and cash mergers. To achieve this goal, dummy variables are created showing whether  the firm will be 
an acquirer or a target in a stock, cash or a mixed acquisition during the next four quarters. The dummies for mixed acquisitions are included in all models but are not reported below for brevity. In models (1) and (3) 
the dependent variables are the quarterly dollar value of individual net stock purchases and the quarterly individual net stock purchases as a percentage of prior common stock holdings respectively. Net purchase is 
defined as the dollar value of purchases minus sales. The dependent variables in models (2) and (4) are constructed by averaging the dependent variables in models (1) and (3) across all managers in a given firm.  
Dollar value of equity stake is the number of common shares held at the beginning of the quarter times the beginning-of-the-quarter stock price. RETq(t-2),q(t) denotes stock return during the last two quarters. RETq(t-
4),q(t-2) denotes the stock return during the two quarters before the last two quarters. VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) denotes the annualized stock return volatility during the two quarters before the last two quarter. VOLq(t-2),q(t) -
VOLq(t-4),q(t-2) is the change in volatility between the last two quarters and the previous two quarters. Each regression includes industry and year-quarter dummies. Industries are defined using the 20 industry 
definition of Grinblatt and Moskovitz (1999).  Coefficient estimates are reported first and robust t-statistics with clustering at the manager (columns one and three) or firm level (columns two and four) second in each 
column. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. All dollar amounts are in thousands of 2004 dollars.Dollar Value of Dollar Value of Net Individual Net Net Purchases of 
Individual Net Purchases of  Purchases of  Company Stock as
Purchases of Company Stock Company Stock as Percentage of
Company Stock Averaged by Firms Percentage of  Prior Exposure
Prior Exposure Averaged by Firms
STOCK -522 *** -763 *** -52.9 *** -79.1 ***
-357      -403      -15.4      -17.9     
N = 7027 N = 590 N = 7027 N = 590
MIXED -332 *** -451 *** -35.8 *** -42.5 ***
-268      -388      -18.6      -22.1     
N = 3182 N = 300 N = 3182 N = 300
CASH -342 ** -375      -47.9 *** -69.4 ***
-281      -385      -17.9      -19.7     
N = 3045 N = 298 N = 3045 N = 298
STOCK-CASH -181 ** -388 *** -5.0 *** -9.7 ***
-76      -19      2.5      1.7     
STOCK -200 ** -286 *** -35.0 *** -45.4 ***
-175      -221      -15.1      -16.9     
N = 4087 N = 541 N = 4087 N = 541
MIXED -173 *** -152 *** -20.5      -22.7 ***
-262      -228      -18.6      -16.1     
N = 1666 N = 248 N = 1666 N = 248
CASH -106      -121 *** -23.1 *** -22.5 ***
-130      -171      -13.7      -17.9     
N = 1148 N = 225 N = 1148 N = 225
STOCK-CASH -94 ** -165 *** -11.9 *** -22.9 ***
-45      -49      -1.3      1.0     
Targets
Acquirers
Table 13
Management Trading Activity for Acquirer and Target Firms around 1,188 Merger 
Announcements
This table describes the trading patterns of the acquirer firms' managers around merger announcements. All trading
figures are in thousands of 2004 dollars. The first entry is the average value of shares traded, followed by the expected
value, computed as the median (in 1,000 replications) of the empirical distribution of the average number of shares
traded for a random sample of matching control firms. Each acquirer manager is matched to control manager in a size-
prior return-industry matched non-merger firm based on prior shareholdings.Acquirer Name Target Name Ann. Date
Acquirer
4-day
Ann. CAR
Target
4-day
Ann. CAR
Combined
4-day
Ann. CAR
Method
of 
Payment WSJ Article
VIACOM INC PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS INC 9/8/1993 -0.3% 0.3% 0.1% MIXED
Mr. Redstone has been an active buyer of Viacom stock in recent months, contributing to a recent 
price run-up and making it a more valuable currency with which to buy Paramount. Even though 
Viacom has less than half the revenue of Paramount, it has a slightly larger stock-market value.
VIACOM INC BLOCKBUSTER ENTERTAINMENT CORP 9/9/1993 -0.5% 4.3% 2.4% STOCK
SOUTHWESTERN BELL CORP PACIFIC TELESIS GROUP 4/1/1996 -7.2% 19.6% 0.0% STOCK
GILLETTE SAFETY RAZOR CO DURACELL INTERNATIONAL INC 9/12/1996 4.8% 25.5% 8.1% MIXED
Gillette is using its rich stock price, which trades at 33 times trailing 12-month earnings, to pay for 
Duracell, which currently trades at about 24 times trailing 12 month earnings. The deal, which includes
the assumption of debt, is expected to be immediately accretive to earnings for Gillette.
N C N B CORP BARNETT BANKS INC 8/29/1997 -9.7% 22.8% -3.4% STOCK
COMMERCIAL CREDIT CO 
(Travelers Co.) SALOMON INC 9/23/1997 -1.5% 16.3% 0.9% STOCK
Some on Wall Street praised Mr. Weill for making yet another opportunistic deal -- his trademark. 
"This is certainly not a case where Sandy Weill is guilty of paying high prices," said Roy Smith, a 
New York University professor and a Goldman, Sachs & Co. limited partner. Added Stephen 
Treadway, a former Smith Barney executive and now chairman of Pimco Advisors LP's retail mutual 
funds: "This may be a good value in this marketplace because his currency is Travelers stock -- not 
cash." Travelers stock has soared more than tenfold since 1986, more than four times that of the 
broader-market averages.
QWEST COMMUNICATIONS INTL IN L C I INTERNATIONAL INC 3/9/1998 0.5% 11.4% 3.9% STOCK
While Qwest lacks big revenues and earnings, it has a staggering market capitalization of more than $7 
billion. Like WorldCom, which agreed to swallow bigger carrier MCI for $37 billion, Qwest is able to 
use its highflying stock as currency to acquire the bigger carrier.
U S A WASTE SERVICES INC WASTE MANAGEMENT INC 3/11/1998 13.9% 20.6% 17.7% STOCK
Its strong stock price has allowed Mr. Drury to make a steady stream of big acquisitions to sustain 
growth.
COMMERCIAL CREDIT CO CITICORP 4/6/1998 14.0% 15.1% 14.5% STOCK
N C N B CORP BANKAMERICA CORP 4/13/1998 5.8% 4.4% 5.2% STOCK
SOUTHWESTERN BELL CORP AMERITECH CORP 5/11/1998 -8.6% 4.5% -3.7% STOCK
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC DE GENERAL RE CORP 6/19/1998 -0.6% 15.3% 1.8% STOCK
Armed with a particularly rich currency after a recent run-up in the price of Berkshire shares, Mr. 
Buffett set aside his longstanding reluctance to using stock for purchases: General Re stockholders 
will receive roughly an 18% Berkshire stake. 
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC ASCEND COMMUNICATIONS INC 1/11/1999 -6.3% 9.0% -5.0% STOCK
But Lucent's shares have recovered in the past three months -- in fact, they have nearly doubled -- 
enabling a purchase by restoring the value of the currency the company is using to make it. Lucent's 
stock also gives it the power to make acquisitions without diluting its earnings. The shares now trade 
at a rich multiple of about 50 times annual earnings
AT HOME CORPORATION EXCITE INC 1/19/1999 2.0% 31.5% 9.5% STOCK
The hyperkinetic Mr. Jermoluk, known throughout Silicon Valley as TJ, definitely isn't groveling now. 
In the largest Internet merger to date, he has agreed to exchange $7.5 billion in At Home's sky-high 
shares to acquire Excite Inc., one of the World Wide Web's busiest sites. The deal and its price tag -- 
more than double Excite's recent market valuation -- are another sign of the frantic scramble for 
customer traffic and market share in the booming interactive arena. They also illustrate how the 
highflying stock of Internet companies has become a currency that outweighs conventional concerns 
such as sales and profits.
YAHOO INC GEOCITIES 1/27/1999 22.2% 61.6% 24.8% STOCK
The deal is by far Yahoo's largest, and its first major effort to use its highflying stock as acquisition 
currency. Jeff Mallett, its president, said the move is part of an effort by Yahoo to increase its brand 
awareness on the Web.
YAHOO INC BROADCAST COM INC 3/22/1999 -7.2% 27.3% -4.4% STOCK
Within only three months, Yahoo has used more than $10 billion of its highflying stock to purchase 
two major Web companies, GeoCities Inc. and broadcast.com Inc. And yesterday, just after the Santa 
Clara, Calif., Internet "portal" confirmed that it had agreed to spend $5.7 billion for broadcast.com, the 
Dallas-based Internet broadcaster, Yahoo executives implied that more merger mania lies ahead.
ELECTRIC BOAT CO GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORP NEW 5/17/1999 -8.0% 16.1% -0.8% STOCK
Financially, the decision by General Dynamics exploits a differential in the respective stock price-to-
earnings multiples, allowing the acquirer to use its higher priced shares to snare what could be 
considered a fairly inexpensive stock.
ALLIED CHEMICAL & DYE CORP HONEYWELL INC 6/7/1999 3.0% 16.5% 6.6% MIXED
VIACOM INC C B S CORP 9/7/1999 10.2% 4.1% 5.0% STOCK
AMERICA ONLINE INC TIME WARNER INC 1/10/2000 -17.6% 23.8% -4.4% STOCK
Some analysts believe the drop in the stock prices of AOL and Time Warner spells one thing: 
Investors are scrutinizing the merger and finally catching on to the hot air in Internet valuations. "The 
reason why the stocks of Internet companies like Yahoo! and AOL are dropping lately is because the 
sharp investors are starting to realize that companies like Yahoo can't justify being traded at 400 times 
earnings, or stock-price targets of $500 a share, when Yahoo's actual annualized earnings are at just 
about 75 cents a share," says Robert A. Olstein, manager of the Olstein Financial Alert mutual fund.
VERISIGN INC NETWORK SOLUTIONS INC 3/7/2000 -19.1% 28.0% -5.1% STOCK
The more cynical view, says Broadview Chief Executive Paul Deninger, is that technology companies 
with highflying stock prices are doing these deals "because they have the currency and don't know how
long it will last."
I2 TECHNOLOGIES INC ASPECT DEVELOPMENT INC 3/13/2000 -9.8% 14.6% -6.7% STOCK
The merging of the two companies also brings together a couple of stock-market highfliers. During the 
past six months, i2's stock has soared 889%, while Aspect Development has shot up 688%, reflecting 
Wall Street's enthusiasm for companies that facilitate business-to-business e-commerce.
VERITAS SOFTWARE CORP SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY 3/29/2000 -6.7% -2.0% -5.8% MIXED
The deal is designed to resolve difficulties that have arisen for Seagate because of its 33% stake in 
software maker Veritas, of Mountain View, Calif., the value of which has soared in recent months and 
which is now valued at well more than all of Seagate's disk-drive operations. Seagate executives 
described the transactions as a creative way of "unlocking" the value of those Veritas shares in a way 
that spared an excessive tax burden on both Seagate and its shareholders.
Table 14
Acquirers that are identified as "Overvalued" from the merger announcement articles in Wall Street JournalDollar Value of Individual Net
Individual Net Purchases of 
Purchases of Company Stock as
Company Stock Percentage of 
Prior Exposure
I. Overvalued Acquirer -3,608 *** -144.8 ***
-1,310      -38.5     
N = 147 N = 147
II. Not Overvalued Acquirer -821 ** -65.4 ***
-964      -27.7     
N = 655 N = 655
Difference I-II -2,787 *   -79.4 ***
-346      -10.9     
Table 15
Management Trading Activity for 147 "Overvalued" and 655 "Not-
Overvalued" Acquirer Firm Managers as identified from
Wall Street Journal Articles
This table describes the trading patterns of the acquirer firms' managers around merger
announcements. All trading figures are in thousands of 2004 dollars. The first entry is the average
value of shares traded, followed by the expected value, computed as the median (in 1,000
replications) of the empirical distribution of the average number of shares traded for a random
sample of matching control firms. Each acquirer manager is matched to control manager in a size-
prior return-industry matched non-merger firm based on prior shareholdings.